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CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES: 
REESTABLISHING THE BALANCE 
WITHIN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
Mary Christine Hutton* 
Child advocates-social workers, psychologists, physicians, at-
torneys-have played a powerful role in drawing the focus of 
American society to the vulnerable situation of children in our 
culture. From notices on milk cartons and in newspapers to 
scholarly discussions in professional journals, advocates address 
the unique problems of children. The public may not consciously 
distinguish among the types of violence towards children, 1 but it 
is more aware of adult mistreatment of children than ever 
before. Particularly in the area of child sexual abuse,2 advocates 
have achieved remarkable success in destroying many of the 
myths surrounding children's experience and veracity and in ed-
ucating the public about their situation.3 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law. A.B., 1973, 
St. Joseph's University; J.D., 1978, Washburn University; LL.M., 1984, Harvard Univer-
sity Law School. The author wishes to thank Gerald Kaufman for his research assistance. 
1. Even with increased awareness, however, the public may not distinguish different 
types of violence toward children. See R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE (1978); CRIT-
ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE (R. Bourne & E. Newberger eds. 1979); Pfohl, The 
"Discovery" of Child Abuse, 24 Soc. PROBS. 310 (1976-1977); see also THE HISTORY OF 
CHILDHOOD (L. deMause ed. 1974) (survey of the abuse of children throughout history). 
2. Simply defined, child sexual abuse is "a sexual act imposed on a child who lacks 
emotional, maturational, and cognitive development." Sgroi, Blick & Porter, A Concep-
tual Framework for Child Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN 
CHILD SEXUAL ABusE 9 (S. Sgroi ed. 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; see also D. 
FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 2-16 (1979); SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN 
AND ADOLESCENTS (A. Burgess, A. Groth, L. Holmstrom & S. Sgroi eds. 1978); Finkelhor, 
Common Features of Family Abuse, in THE DARK SmE OF FAMILIES 17 (D. Finkelhor, R. 
Gelles, G. Hotaling & M. Straus eds. 1983); Tierney & Corwin, Exploring Intrafamilial 
Child Sexual Abuse: A Systems Approach, in THE DARK SmE OF FAMILIES, supra, at 102. 
The extent of child sexual abuse is unknown, although estimates have been made. 
Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of lntrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse 
of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABusE & NEGLECT 133 (1983) (random sample of 930 
women in San Francisco revealing that 38% had experienced abuse before age 18). 
3. See D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 87-106 (1984). Finkelhor notes that a sur-
vey of Boston parents in 1981 revealed that many of the past myths and misconceptions 
about child sexual abuse no longer exist. Approximately 93% of the respondents had 
been exposed to a discussion of child sexual abuse within the last year. Many respon-
dents still maintained the belief, however, that the child bore some responsibility for the 
sexual contact if he or she did not object strenuously. See also Berliner, The Child Wit· 
ness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 167, 178-79 (1985). 
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In addition to their efforts to eliminate inappropriate and un-
founded attitudes towards children through public awareness 
and education, child advocates have lobbied for legislation to as-
sist children, particularly in the criminal justice system. To ac-
complish their lobbying objectives, the advocates have exposed 
some of the system's past failures in dealing with children as 
victims and witnesses.• Child advocates have also provided the 
impetus behind amendments to the rules of evidence,5 videotap-
ing of children's statements,6 proposals to remove the child from 
courtroom proceedings,7 and the use of supportive courtroom 
techniques for the child.8 Perhaps more importantly, psychia-
trists, psychologists, and other professionals who have studied 
the problem have added a dimension of expertise, and have pro-
vided valuable insight into the extent of child sexual abuse and 
the symptoms of abused children.9 
4. See, e.g., Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the 
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969); Parker, The Rights of Child 
Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1982); 
The Child Witness, J. Soc. lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 1-175. 
5. The most common amendments create an exception to the hearsay rule for child 
victims of sexual abuse. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp. 1986); CoLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 18-3-411(3) (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 11 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (Supp. 1986); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS§ 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5-411 (Supp. 1986); VT. R. Evm. 
804a (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987). 
6. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251 to -4253 (Supp. 
1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2037 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 
Supp. 1987); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 15:283, :440.1-:440.6 (West Supp. 1987J; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 
(Supp. 1986) ("recorded by any means approved by the court"); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-
15-401 to -403 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 
§ 753 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 967.04(1)-(3), 967.04(7) (West 1985 & Supp. 1986). 
Several authorities have expressed discomfort with enhancement of credibility through 
"status-conferral" by using closed circuit TV or videotaping. See Hochheiser v. Superior 
Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777,786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278-79 (1984), discussed in Graham, 
lndicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 67-76 (1985). 
7. Parker, supra note 4, at 653; Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without 
Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131 (1981). 
8. E.g., Whitcomb, Assisting Child Victims in the Courts: The Practical Side of Leg-
islative Reform, in PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 13 (National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & 
Protection 1985) [hereinafter PAPERS FROM NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE) (recom-
mending techniques that do not rely on advanced technology, such as the use of dolls 
and child-sized chairs in the courtroom, and demystification of the courtroom prior to 
trial); see also J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1981). 
9. See infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text. Experts in the field of child sexual 
abuse are developing a wealth of literature. Among the most useful are D. FINKELHOR, 
supra note 3; HANDBOOK, supra note 2; and THE DARK SmE OF FAMILIES, supra note 2. 
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Operating the criminal justice system with more sensitivity to-
ward children and with a greater role for child advocates has 
resulted in major departures from the traditional adversarial 
methods of trial. In the past, cases involving child victims pro-
ceeded along the same lines as other criminal trials, with in-
depth and vigorous cross-examination of the victim, 10 skepticism 
toward the child's account, and little psychiatric or psychological 
expertise in the field to support the child's claim. 11 Now that 
child advocates have modified the adversary process to accom-
modate child victims, the impact of those modifications on the 
goals of the adversary system should be examined. 
This Article begins with an overview of the adversary process 
and how it has changed in recent years to respond to the needs 
of children. The Article highlights two of the goals of the adver-
sary process-(!) testing and probing of two sides to a story, and 
(2) refraining from a decision until the complete story is 
told-to examine how they can be retained in spite of these 
changes. Part II pinpoints the assignment of multiple or poorly-
defined roles to the child sexual abuse professionals12 as one of 
the potential impediments to preserving the goals of the adver-
sarial system. The performance of multiple roles occurs when 
the legal system asks these professionals to perform four func-
tions: to evaluate whether the alleged acts have occurred, to 
chronicle the child's account of events, to serve as an expert wit-
ness on the problem of child sexual abuse, and to act as an advo-
cate· and supporter for the child. The assignment of a poorly-
defined role occurs when the intervenor is asked to perform one 
function, such as therapy, and the legal system misuses the re-
sults. Although these problems with assigned functions are not 
The classic study in the field is V. DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX 
CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS (1969). 
10. See F. BAILEY & H. RoTHBLATT, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: RAPE AND OTHER SEX 
CRIMES § 333 (1973) (recommending that cross-examination of the child should not be 
brutal, so as to arouse sympathy, but should be designed-to lead the child into traps). 
11. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924(a) (Chadbourn rev. 
ed. 1970 & Supp. 1987) (suggesting that a young girl or woman complainant who charges 
a sexual crime should have a psychiatric examination because of the proclivity of con-
triving false charges against men: "[t)heir psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted 
partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly 
by bad social environment, [and] partly by temporary physiological or emotional condi-
tions"); M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 374 (1952); Goodman, 
Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1984, at 9. 
12. This generic term includes protective service workers, child psychologists, and 
other professionals who are asked to intervene to assist children alleged to have been 
abused sexually. The terms "intervenor" and "child sexual abuse professional" are used 
interchangeably throughout this Article. 
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present in every case, they arise frequently enough to warrant 
scrutiny of their effect on the adversary nature of criminal pro-
ceedings and on the checks built into the system. Finally, Part 
III concludes that if multiple functions have been assigned to an 
intervenor or if the potential for misuse of the intervenor's work 
exists, the court should limit the scope of the intervenor's testi-
mony to avoid its misapplication or should appoint an indepen-
dent expert to evaluate and critique the intervenor's work. 
I. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
An adversarial process13 and the availability of trial by jury 
characterize the American system of adjudication in criminal 
cases. The adversarial model anticipates each litigant will have a 
theory of the case and will present evidence and witnesses who 
support that position to a neutral fact finder. 14 The latter will 
hear the testimony, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and 
decide which party will prevail. The underlying theory is that 
the interested parties, motivated by the desire to win, will mar-
shal the forces needed to convince the fact finder. lli In the pro-
cess, it is hoped, truth will be determined and justice achieved.16 
13. The development of the adversary system is traced in 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956); G. KEETON, THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE COM-
MON LAW (1966). The modern adversary process is discussed in J. FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL 80-125 (1949) and C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 116-40 (1980); see also 
Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulation of-Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Ac-
complished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 115, 126-31 (1985) (discussing existing trial procedure as effective means of 
avoiding conviction of the innocent and warning that drastic modifications in child sex-
ual abuse cases would alter the balance in favor of conviction). 
14. C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 275; Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON 
AMERICAN LAW 34-47 (H. Berman ed. 1971). 
15. C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 321. But see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An 
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 (1975) (criticizing the adversarial "win-
ning" approach); contra Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1060 (1975) (arguing that the "winning" approach of the adversary system works well 
not only in establishing truth but also in protecting basic rights). 
16. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (applying a theory of the 
adversary system in which parties contest all issues before a court of law, the need to 
develop all facts is fundamental, and to ensure justice, the process must be available for 
the production of evidence for both sides). Whether the system actually functions ac-
cording to the theory behind it is a matter of debate. L. FoRER, THE DEATH OF THE LAW 
131-54 (1975) (critiquing the adversary process); J. FRANK, supra note 13, at 80-102 (not-
ing that "fighting" theory of the adversary system, when excessive, disserves the "truth" -
seeking process); Frankel, supra note 15; Freedman, supra note 15. 
Some have argued that the adoption of a neutral posture by the fact finder results in 
an emphasis on dispute resolution between the parties rather than a search for truth. 
This argument is addressed in S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3 (1984). 
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The adversarial process is characterized in large part by the 
division of functions performed by the participants.17 The fact 
finder, either judge or jury, is a pa,ssive participant in the case, 
relying on the evidence as it is presented by the parties and con-
trolled by the rules governing its admissibility and use at trial.18 
In addition, the fact finder must be neutral; decisions in the case 
should be objective and free from bias. 19 
The function of the fact finder sharply contrasts with that of 
the advocate. Each litigant in the case is entitled to have a rep-
resentative who will present that party's theory as forcefully and 
persuasively as possible. The advocate embraces the client's po-
sition and does what is needed, within ethical constraints, to 
win.20 
The tools of the advocate vary depending on the case. One of 
the most powerful in a criminal trial is the accused's right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him or her.21 
The use of leading questions in cross-examination exposes to the 
fact finder the witness's faulty perception, fading memory, bias, 
motive, and lack of opportunity to observe.22 One witness's per-
ceptions may differ radically from another's-each believing his 
account is the truth. 23 Cross-examination points out the discrep-
ancies and gives the fact finder the opportunity to evaluate 
which vers10n more closely approximates reality. At the same 
17. Fuller, supra note 14, at 30. 
18. C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 321. 
19. Fuller, supra note 14, at 30. The following is typical of instructions to the jury on 
its duty in reaching a verdict: 
Consider this case carefully and honestly with due regard for the interests of 
society and the rights of the defendant. You should decide the case fairly and 
impartially without fear or favor upon the evidence produced and the instruc-
tions of the court. It must not be decided from any feeling of bias or prejudice 
against or sympathy for the defendant. Your duty upon such fair consideration 
of the case is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged in the information. 
South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions 1-23 (1970). 
20. J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY §§ 1.2-.10 (1975); J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS 5-6 
(1983). But see Frankel, supra note 15, at 1036; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 
Wis. L. REV. 30 (critiquing lawyers' rationalizations of the profession's failure to be 
bound by personal and social norms imposed on the rest of society). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
22. 3A J. WmMORE, supra note 11, §§ 948-956, 993-995; C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 
337; Markus, A Theory of Trial Advocacy, 56 TULANE L. REV. 95, 97-101, 106-11 (1981). 
23. J. FRANK, supra note 13, at 17-21; J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 
8-44 (1980); F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION 27 (4th ed. 1936); Goodman & 
Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
181, 184 (1985); Markus, supra note 22, at 97-101. 
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time, leading questions enable the advocate to suggest his or her 
client's theory of the case to the fact finder. 24 
The third important participant in the adversary process is 
the witness. In theory, witnesses are called not to advocate one 
side or the other, but to tell the truth as they know it.26 Al-
though a party may call a witness who is hostile to his or her 
case, for the most part; a party will call witnesses who help to 
establish his or her point of view.26 
The functions and types of witnesses have undergone dra-
matic changes over time with the refinement of the adversary 
system. 27 In general, witnesses now can be categorized as follows: 
(1) occurrence witnesses (those who have observed an event in 
the case or one relevant to the case),28 (2) expert witnesses 
(those who have knowledge that will help jurors to understand 
relevant evidence),29 (3) reputation and opinion witnesses (those 
who offer reputation or opinion evidence on character or credi-
bility),30 and (4) hearsay witnesses (those who give accounts not· 
based on firsthand knowledge).31 In a typical case, it is unlikely 
that a single witness will fall into .multiple categories, but this 
possibility exists, and nothing in the system prevents it from 
occurring. 
24. J. McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 107 (1961); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL 
TECHNIQUES 240-41 (1980). 
25. A typical oath or affirmance for a witness requires that the person tell "the truth, 
the whole truth and nothing but the truth." E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-3.1 {1979); 
see also Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171, 1173 {5th Cir. 1981) {stating that 
witnesses do not belong to parties, and the jury is entitled to hear all relevant evidence, 
so any attempt to exclude such evidence by settlement agreement is improper). 
26. This is in contrast to the operation of the continental systems. See generally 
Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 
1088, 1090-95 {1975) (noting that all witnesses are evidentiary sources for the bench and 
there are no separate witnesses for prosecution and defense). 
27. In the early days of the common law, "compurgators" {"oath-helpers") were 
called, not to give substantive evidence, but to swear the defendant was truthful in deny-
ing his guilt of the offense. Compurgators eventually were replaced by witnesses who 
could testify about the facts at issue in the case, based upon hearsay and, later, upon 
personal knowledge. See generally C. REMBAR, supra note 13, at 100-01, 144-52. In some 
jurisdictions, the defendant was excluded as a witness because he was deemed incompe-
tent to testify under oath, yet was permitted to make an unsworn statement. E.g., Fergu-
son v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 {1961). 
28. T. MAUET, supra note 24, at 98-99. 
29. FED. R. Evm. 702. See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Ev1-
DENCE 11 702(01] (1985 & Supp. 1987). 
30. FED. R. Evm. 404, 405, 608, 609. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra 
note 29, 1111 404(01)-405(03]; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 1111 608(03]-[04], 
608[08]; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 100, 550 {E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). 
31. FED. R. Evm. 801-806. See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 
1111 801(01)-806(02). 
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Traditionally, occurrence witnesses have been the mainstay of 
criminal cases. 32 The prosecutor calls the victim and whomever 
else observed the alleged acts to describe what happened, and, 
on cross-examination, the defense probes and challenges the wit-
nesses' accounts. The legal system disfavors hearsay accounts of 
the alleged acts because of the bias against rumor and un-
founded assertions as the basis for a criminal conviction. 33 De-
spite the general disfavor in which hearsay testimony is held, 
however, numerous exceptions have dev~loped over the years be-
cause, in theory, the testimony in · question is reliable and 
trustworthy. 34 
Why has the adversary system continued in this basic form 
with these settled role assignments? Tradition, habit, and fear of 
change off er a partial explanation. 311 Proponents of the system, 
however, offer two more fundamental rationales. First, they ar-
gue that truth is elusive36 and can best be determined by explor-
ing multiple versions of events as exposed by the advocate's pos-
ing of difficult and probing questions. 37 Second, the proponents 
claim that such a presentation is the most effective way of pre-
cluding judgments made too swiftly, in reliance on what is famil-
iar to the fact finder. 38 Forcing the decision maker to delay pass-
ing judgment on the case until both sides have presented their 
evidence precludes reaching conclusions based on the fact 
finder's own biases and preconceptions. The presentations of 
counsel should comprise a full and zealous version of events, 
which will enable the fact finder to view the case through the 
eyes of each litigant and piece together the fragments presented 
by the witnesses into an overall picture of what occurred. 39 
32. T. MAUET, supra note 24, at 98-99. 
33. This is also the genesis of the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI; 5 J. W1GMORE, supra note 11, § 1364. 
34. FED. R. Evm. 803, 804. 
35. Frankel, supra note 15, at 1052-55. 
36. J. TANFORD, supra note 20, at 5. 
37. Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge 
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1067-68, 1076-77 (1975) (stating that the juxta-
position of two contrary perspectives and the impact of challenge and counterproof often 
disclose to neutral intelligence the most likely structure of truth; also noting the differ-
ence between legal truth and factual truth). But see Damaska, supra note 26, at 1090-95; 
Frankel, supra note 15, at 1038-39. 
38. See Fuller, supra note 14, at 39-40. 
39. Id.; see also Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems 
of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 29-31 (arguing that the adversary process 
should be employed in adjudications of delinquency to maintain the testing of both sides 
and to avoid jumping to conclusions). 
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In response to a deeply-rooted dissatisfaction with the work-
ings of the adversary process in cases with child victims,4° cer-
tain changes have been made to accommodate children. The re-
forms are particularly relevant in cases of child sexual abuse, 
because the traditional form of adjudication has changed radi-
cally. In the past, the fact finder relied primarily on the testi-
mony of the child.•1 This testimony was corroborated by any 
physical evidence and by the credibility of the child42 and rein-
forced by the fact finder's own view of the likelihood that child 
sexual abuse occurred.43 Revisions to hearsay rules in some juris-
dictions have eliminated the testimony of the child as a neces-
sary part of the government's case.44 As a result, someone to 
whom the child has related the story may substitute for the 
child in court and explain the child's version of events. That 
person is called as a proxy for the child, or as a supplemental 
witness to reaffirm the child's testimony. This new approach is a 
response to the perception that the process of cross-examination 
confuses and traumatizes children and that the benefits of such 
40. See Parker, supra note 4. 
41. This, of course, assumes that the child was found competent to testify. See Mel-
ton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1981). 
42. See Goodman, Golding & Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, J. Soc. 
lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 139 (reviewing factors that influence jurors' perceptions of the 
credibility of child witnesses); see also Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child 
Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 201 (1980) (study of the reliability of 
children as witnesses); Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, J. Soc. 
lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 51 (regarding the suggestibility of children). 
43. In some cases, juries convicted on the word of the child, but legal rules required 
reversal of the conviction. See, e.g., State v. Quinnild, 231 Minn. 99, 42 N.W.2d 409 
(1950) (holding that the statements of a 13-year-old boy two hours after sexual assault 
are not properly admitted as res gestae; conviction reversed; no expert testimony); State 
v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 565, 16 S.E. 803 (1893) (reversing conviction for carnal knowledge 
of a five-year-old girl; child's testimony was "prattle"); Rex v. Coyle, N. Ir. 208 (C.A. 
1926) (holding that the unsworn testimony of a young child was not corroborated by the 
unsworn testimony of other children or by her statements to her mother). But see State 
v. Fisher, 222 Kan. 76, 563 P.2d 1012 (1977) (convicting defendant in a case where the· 
only evidence was that an 11-year-old girl reported incidents of sexual abuse to her 
mother, who took her to the police where she repeated her account; child testified con-
sistently at preliminary hearing; at trial, child recanted and said she had lied; defendant 
denied the allegations); State v. Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 40 N.W.2d 347 (1949) (affirming 
conviction for indecent assault on four-year-old boy; statements to mother describing 
event admissible as res gestae; no expert testimony). 
Expert testimony seems not to have been widely used in cases of child sexual abuse 
before the late 1970's when research in the area developed to a sophisticated level. State 
v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982), was among the first to employ such testi-
mony. See Goodman, supra note 11, at 18-24 (describing psychological research on chil-
dren in the twentieth century). 
44. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 19-16-38 (1987); WASH. REV. CoDE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 
1987); see supra note 5. 
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questioning do not outweigh the costs of harming the child or 
obscuring the truth. 411 
In the process of "piecing together" the case, the fact finder 
may not be given the opportunity to view the child and hear his 
or· her account firsthand, but instead, may have to rely on sec-
ondary sources such as the child's proxy. In addition, the fact 
finder may have to rely on the explanations of expert witnesses 
about child sexual abuse. Although the use of expert witnesses 
in adversary proceedings is far from new, their use in sexual 
abuse cases for the government is a relatively recent develop-
ment. 46 In many courts, they are given wide latitude to explain 
sexual abuse and how children react to it. 47 Government counsel 
seeks their explanations particularly when the defense alleges 
fabrication or fantasy by the child. In effect, they are given the 
opportunity to explain the facts of the case in a coherent man-
ner to the fact finder. 
How does the adversary proce$s work once these reforms have 
been made? The functions of the fact finder and advocate re-
main the same, but the information presented to the jury or 
judge differs in content and form, and the presentation is ac-
complished with different types of witnesses. The expert witness 
and hearsay witness may replace or supplement the occurrence 
witness-the child-as the primary source of information for the 
fact finder. The need to judge the credibility and reliability of 
the occurrence witness's account at trial lessens because substi-
tutes for that evidence have been adopted. Credibility need not 
be evaluated solely through the occurrence witness's demeanor; 
the emphasis is on the fact finder's assessment of the hearsay 
45. E.g., State v. McNeely, 314 N.C. 451, 454-57, 333 S.E.2d 738, 740-42 (1985) (pro-
viding an example of cross-examination of a child that convinced the court she was not 
qualified to be a witness); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 416, 484 A.2d 1330, 
1332 (1984) (psychiatrist testifying that a 10-year-old child's testimony should be 
presented by videotape because it would improve its accuracy, and providing his opinion 
that children and adults react in opposite ways to the courtroom's trappings and formali-
ties-adults are more likely to be truthful and children are less likely because they are 
fearful, guilty, anxious, and traumatized). See generally Goodman & Helgeson, Child 
Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 201 (1985); 
Pierron, K.S.A. 60-460(dd): The New Kansas Law Regarding Admissibility of Child-
Victim Hearsay Statements, 52 J. KAN. B.A. 88, 89 (1983) ("A gap between what is relia-
ble and what is admissible has developed. Children may often be able to tell who brutal-
ized them with great believability and truthfulness. However, the information is not al-
ways admissible if the child is not qualified as a witness."); Skoler, New Hearsay 
Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 37, 47 
(1984); Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse 
Cases, 83 CoLuM. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1983). 
46. See supra note 43; infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text. 
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witness's account of events, bolstered by the expert witness's 
description of the general nature and pattern of child sexual 
abuse.48 
The change in witnesses necessarily has modified the tools of 
the advocate. Cross-examination of the victim-witness to test 
perception, bias, and motive may not be available in the case.49 
Although the hearsay witness and expert can be cross-examined, 
the focus of the cross-examination is different: the inquiry is not 
directed at an occurrence witness's observation of events, but at 
the hearsay witness's or expert witness's interpretation of what 
the child has told them. The advocate tests and probes these 
witnesses' accounts of and conclusions about what happened, 
rather than the facts that comprise the incident, as is done with 
an occurrence witness. Thus, a buff er has been placed between 
the victim-witness and the fact finder. 
Modification of the adversary system to accommodate chil-
dren has been hailed as an important means of ensuring the vin-
dication of children's right to be free from abuse.Go How these 
changes work in practice must be examined closely to be certain 
that the goals of the adversary system-scrutiny of evidence and 
impartiality before the time of judgment-have been preserved. 
The fact finder may be less able and less likely to act in accor-
dance· with the goals of the adversary process as a result of the 
reforms. Eliminating the ability to probe a firsthand account re-
sults in the presentation of a sanitized version of those observa-
tions to the fact finder. Often, the system has asked the person 
who gives that presentation to decide whether sexual abuse oc-
curred. Gl The fact finder may take the witness's affirmative re-
48. E.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984). 
49. The child's statement describing an act of sexual contact or rape is admissible if 
certain conditions are met. See supra note 5; infra note 111. If the child is unavailable as 
a witness, his or her statement is admissible if there is corroboration of the act. See State 
v. Spronk, 379 N.W.2d 312, 313-14 (S.D. 1985). 
50. Skoler, supra note 45, at 38-46 (arguing that new hearsay exceptions for child 
victims of sex crimes are needed because the out-of-court statement of a child may be 
more reliable than an in-court statement). But see Schultz, The Child Sex Victim: So-
cial, Psychological and Legal Perspectives, 52 CHILD WELFARE 147, 150 (1973) (stating 
that the trauma to a child is caused not only by society's use of the victim to prosecute 
the offender, but also by parents' reactions; i.e., parents may need to prove to themselves 
and to society that their child did not participate in sexual activity voluntarily and that 
they were not failures as parents). 
51. E.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984) (admitting the account of a 
clinical psychologist, who had been asked to validate the claim of abuse, because the 
child was unavailable); see also Skoler, supra note 45, at 17; infra notes 83-91 and ac-
companying text (discussing guidelines for expert investigation of abuse). 
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sponse as conclusive on that question of fact. 112 In effect, the af-
firmative response tells the fact finder that the alleged events 
occurred, so there is no need to await the complete presentation 
of the evidence. 
In which cases does the potential undercutting of the goals of 
the adversary process occur? The most likely situations are 
those where the checks built into the adversary system are not 
able to function: when testing and probing are impossible or in-
effective, or when the testimony is presented in such a manner 
that the fact finder is permitted to reach a conclusion without 
hearing the full presentation. Although this can occur in any fac-
tual situation, it is most likely when the system asks the inter-
venor to perform multiple or poorly-defined roles and places 
heavy reliance on the intervenor because of the lack of physical 
or other corroborating evidence. 
II. THE INTERVENOR IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
Although the courts generally embrace innovative theoretical 
developments concerning the dynamics of child sexual abuse 
and admit expert testimony describing it,63 some courts express 
reservations about the evidence and how it has been derived. 114 
A. Recent Cases 
In People v. Roscoe/'11 the court refused to allow a psychologist 
to testify in the government's case-in-chief about the specific 
facts of a child sexual abuse case or to inform the jury of his 
diagnosis that the complainant was the victim of sexual abuse.116 
52. E.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State v. 
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985). 
53. E.g., Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 688 P.2d 326 (1984); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 
453, 706 P.2d 1009 (1985); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984); State v. 
Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 
P.2d 96 (1983). 
54. E.g., Colgan v. State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the vali-
dation of child sexual abuse by a therapist may not have gained scientific acceptance, 
but it was not reversible error to admit); Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 
(1985). 
55. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985). 
56. In Roscoe, the victim was a 15-year-old boy who allegedly was molested by his 
neighbor on several occasions. Although the defendant did not testify, he denied culpa-
bility through his attorney. Id. at 1096, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 47. The government called the 
boy's therapist in its case-in-chief to discuss in detail the account given by the victim 
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In reaching this determination, the court relied heavily on Peo-
ple v. Bledsoe,r.7 which it interpreted as establishing a broad 
prohibition against "misuse of psychologists' testimony."&8 The 
misuse refers to the introduction of the diagnosis of a psycholo-
gist who is engaged in a therapeutic relationship with the victim 
and thus has a professional duty to help him. The Roscoe court 
characterized testimony of this type as an effort by the govern-
ment to have the psychologist decide the case for the jury-that 
and to explain why he concluded that the boy was a victim of ongoing molestation. Id. at 
1098 n.2, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49 n.2. The court ruled that the admission of the testimony 
was error, although not one requiring reversal. The court added that expert testimony 
would have been admissible as rebuttal evidence or to describe child sexual abuse in 
general terms. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
57. 36 Cal. 3d 236,681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). The question presented in 
Bledsoe was the admissibility of evidence of rape trauma syndrome in the government's 
case-in-chief as substantive evidence to prove a rape had occurred. The court rejected 
the use of rape trauma syndrome evidence for that purpose, although it reserved judg-
ment on the evidence's admissibility for other purposes. 
In Bledsoe, the court focused on whether rape trauma syndrome testimony would meet 
the tests for admissibility of new scientific evidence set forth in Frye v. United States, 
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). It acknowledged that such testimony had been offered in 
numerous cases to rebut the defense of consent, but distinguished these cases by noting 
that in the case at bar, the evidence was not offered to rebut misconceptions about the 
presumed behavior of rape victims, but to prove that a rape had occurred. The court 
distinguished evidence of rape trauma syndrome from other scientific methods of proof, 
such as battered child syndrome, and concluded that rape trauma syndrome 
was not devised to determine the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particular past 
event-Le., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred-but rather was 
developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, 
predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors' clients or 
patients. 
36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The court emphasized that 
the role of the counselor is to provide services to the client, not to make a judgment 
about whether a "real" rape occurred or the victim's credibility. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 
300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. 
The court went on to remark that rape counselors normally do not probe inconsisten-
cies in their clients' descriptions of the facts or conduct independent investigations to 
confirm the allegations, id., for their function is merely to help their clients. Therefore, 
the historical accuracy of the client's account is not of great importance to them. The 
court concluded that because rape trauma syndrome was developed for purposes differ-
ent from those of the battered child syndrome and does not consist of a narrow set of 
criteria or symptoms whose presence demonstrates the client has been raped, it is inad-
missible to prove the witness was raped. Id. at 251-52, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. 
at 460; see also State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 
S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984). But see State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982). Cf. 
State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161,175,689 P.2d 822,832 (1984) (Schroeder, C.J., dissent-
ing) (urging the court to reexamine its decision in Marks allowing the testimony of rape 
trauma syndrome). See generally Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: 
The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Tes-
timony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985); Note, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 301 (1984). 
58. 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49. 
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is, to tell the jury to accept the doctor's diagnosis and then con-
clude the defendant is guilty.119 
The court's underlying concern in Roscoe was that a jury 
would defer to a mental health professional who was not under a 
duty to investigate the accuracy of the patient's account. The 
court theorized that the professional's task was to assist the 
complainant with his emotional needs, not to make a judgment 
that an offense occurred in a legal sense. Thus, although an ex-
pert's description about characteristics and behavior of abuse 
victims in general would be proper, especially as rebuttal evi-
dence, the use of the testimony as substantive evidence in the 
case-in-chief was not appropriate.60 
People v. Payan61 also analyzed the misuse of testimony given 
by an expert who stands in a therapeutic relationship with the 
purported victim. In Payan, the trial court permitted a physi-
cian to testify that three children had been sexually molested. 
The physician's opinion was based on a review of police and 
medical reports and a preliminary hearing transcript, not on in-
terviews with the children. The appellate court noted that the 
physician did not have a patient-therapist relationship with the 
children and ref erred to the victims as a class in reaching the 
conclusion,62 thus overcoming two hurdles set by Bledsoe. The 
court expressed some reservations about the doctor giving an 
opinion on whether the children had been molested,63 but con-
59. Id. at 1100-01, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
60. Id. 
61. 220 Cal. Rptr.-126 (Ct. App. 1985). 
62. Id. at 130. As the court explained in People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 
1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985): 
The language [of Bledsoe) suggests-although it does not explicitly re-
quire-that the opinion testimony must be based upon the literature in the field 
and the general professional experience of the witness rather than upon an anal-
ysis and diagnosis based upon a review and evaluation of the facts in the .case at 
hand. Thus, for example, a victim whose credibility is attacked for initially de-
nying that he had been molested could be rehabilitated by expert testimony that 
such denials are more likely than not in molestation cases. The testimony would 
not be that this particular child was a victim of molestation, causing him to react 
in a certain way, but rather that as a class victims of molestation typically make 
poor witnesses, and are reluctant to disclose or discuss the sordid episodes. 
63. In resolving the problem of admitting the physician's opinion about children 
whom she had never seen, the court noted that an expert may base an opinion upon 
hearsay and may rely on reports and opinions of other physicians. 220 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
It commented that simply because the expert opinion coincides with an ultimate issue of 
fact, including the credibility of a witness, that would not make it inadmissible: Id. at 
133. The court cautioned that expert testimony on child sexual abuse may not always be 
admissible, but that it is properly admitted if it will aid the jury in understanding factors 
that influence a child's behavior or in explaining the presence or absence of medical 
findings. Id. 
In Payan, the three children testified about the abuse, several witnesses related hear-
say statements made by the children, and a second physician testified about their physi-
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eluded the trial court's "careful admonishments" to the jury had 
cured any error.84 
Roscoe and Payan highlight an unspoken concern that is de-
veloping in some circles about the· limits of expert testimony in 
child sexual abuse cases.811 Although these courts described the 
problem as a potential misuse of expert testimony, other courts 
are less specific in their rationale for disapproving the use of 
such testimony. For example, in State v. Logue,88 the trial court 
permitted a social worker to testify that, in her opinion, the 
four-year-old complainant had gained his sexual knowledge 
through his experience with the defendant. The South Dakota 
Supreme Court held that the possibility of unfair prejudice out-
weighed the probative value of the testimony, and that the trial 
court had abused its discretion in admitting the opinion.87 The 
cal condition. The expert testified in detail about child sexual abuse and about the child 
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome in general terms before being asked her opinion 
about whether or not these children had been molested. The court took great pains to 
discuss the general testimony on sexual abuse and to describe its importance for cases of 
this type. Id. at 128. The court's conclusion that the admission of the opinion on moles-
tation was not error seems to have been compelled more by the quality of the other 
evidence in the case than by the propriety of such an opinion in itself. 
The court did not address whether the physician's opinion would have been given 
credence in the medical community. The "validation" process-determining the validity 
of a complaint of sexual abuse-seems to anticipate a combination of investigative inter-
viewing and credibility assessment of the child. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, Validation of 
Child Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 39, 40. Personal interviews are de-
scribed as the preferred method for accomplishing this, because of the difficulty in as-
sessing the factual basis of the allegations and fitting them into the patterns and dynam-
ics of sexual abuse. It appears inconsistent to have developed a detailed method for 
validation of child sexual abuse claims that relies on the child as the primary data 
source, and then to circumvent it in the manner employed in Payan. Reliance on second-
ary sources is appropriate for some aspects of managing child sexual abuse cases, such as 
peer review. But permitting this kind of expert opinion in the setting of a criminal case 
appears to weaken the foundation of reliability and helpfulness that is the prerequisite 
to admissibility. The limiting instructions given in Payan and the quality of other evi-
dence in the case appear to have been the basis for the court's refusal to find error. 
64. The instructions were that the physician had not personally interviewed the chil-
dren, that her opinion was based solely on her review of the records, and that the jury 
must determine for itself whether the facts assembled by the doctor in reaching her con-
clusions were supported by the evidence. 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128. 
Importantly, the court distinguished testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome, see infra note 125, from that on rape trauma syndrome, see supra note 57, 
arguing that the former describes a method of clinically diagnosing abuse and is not a 
therapeutic tool, so its admission into evidence would not be a misapplication of medical 
findings. 220 Cal. Rptr. at 129. 
65. E.g., Graham, supra note 6, at 60-61; Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97 (1985). 
66. 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985). 
67. Id. at 157. 
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court expressed general discomfort with the evidence because it 
was not, and could not be, supported by any claim of scientific 
exactitude or empiricism.68 It agreed that jurors are at a disad-
vantage in judging the credibility of children in such cases, but 
concluded that couching the social worker's assessment in the 
guise of an expert opinion "lent a stamp of undue legitimacy to 
her testimony."69 A complicating factor not specifically ad-
dressed by the court was that the social worker served as the 
investigator, hearsay chronicler, and expert witness.70 
The themes developed in these cases reveal some of the diffi-
culties courts experience with the participation of professionals 
as witnesses in child sexual abuse cases. Potential misuse of the 
expert testimony is at the center of the controversy, with some 
courts emphasizing the therapeutic relationship, and other 
courts expressing a more generalized fear that the expert's non-
scientifically-based conclusions will improperly sway the jury. In 
expressing concern over the misuse of expert testimony, the 
courts hint at a potential impediment to the resolution of child 
sexual abuse cases in court: the performance of multiple or 
poorly-defined roles by the intervenors. This concern over the 
functions performed seems to be grounded in a commitment to 
the proper working of the adversary system-a commitment 
that the system maintain the testing and probing of the evi-
dence on both sides of a dispute and preclude the fact finder 
from reaching premature conclusions on only a partial or biased 
presentation of evidence. 
B. Functions Performed by the Intervenor 
In recent years, the legal system has asked intervenors to per-
form any or all of four distinct functions in cases alleging child 
sexual abuse. First, the individual conducts an investigation to 
determine whether or not the acts occurred. 71 In the past, law 
enforcement officials performed this task, with occasional advice 
from protective service workers. Now, in many jurisdictions, po-
68. Id.; see D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: CAN JUSTICE SURVIVE THE Soc1AL Sc1-
ENCEs? 23-27 (1980); Comment, The Psychologist As Expert Witness: Science in the 
Courtroom, 38 Mo. L. REV. 539 (1979); see also Raifman, Problems of Diagnosis and 
Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, BEHAVIORAL SCI. 
& L., Summer 1983, at 115. 
69. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157. 
70. Id. at 154, 156, 159. 
71. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text. 
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lice departments defer to a child sexual abuse professional who 
performs the investigation for the state. Second, the child sexual 
abuse professional preserves in some fashion the child's account 
of events. 72 If allowed by the hearsay rules of the jurisdiction, 
the professional may be asked to recount the child's story at the 
trial of the alleged perpetrator. Third, the intervenor serves as 
an expert witness at trial to explain objectively to the fact finder 
what child sexual abuse is and how it occurs.73 Frequently, this 
amounts to a description of the circumstances under which 
abuse ordinarily takes place, thus destroying myths about sexual 
abuse. Finally, the professional may serve as an advocate for the 
child.74 Frequently, he or she will be an intermediary between 
the child and the prosecution, court, and jury. When needed, the 
advocacy role includes physical protection as well as emotional 
support. In effect, the professional becomes the representative 
and spokesperson for the child. 
1. Investigative function- Traditionally, the police have in-
vestigated alleged criminal acts of any type. 711 Investigation per-
mits a societal response to the allegations through apprehension 
and punishment of the offender or a determination that no 
crime has been committed. Police investigators ordinarily use a 
number of methods to determine what happened, including: 
the search and recording of the crime scene, the collec-
tion and preservation of evidence, the application of mo-
dus operandi techniques, the uncovering of all sources of 
information, the surveillance of suspects, their interview 
and interrogation, the interview of witnesses and victims, 
and the obtaining of search and arrest warrants through 
the courts. 76 
Experience with cases of child sexual abuse has led to a re-
evaluation of the roles of law enforcement officers in such inves-
tigations. The facts of child sexual abuse cases often do not fit 
the pattern of traditional crimes, so many investigative methods 
72. See infra notes 93-121 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text. 
74. See infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text. 
75. Responsibility for investigating criminal acts generally is assigned by statute. 
E.g., S.D. ComFIED LAWS § 22-1-1(20) (Supp. 1986) (defining law enforcement officer as 
one "who is responsible for the prevention or detection of crimes"); id. § 23-3-12 (1979) 
(duty of the division of criminal investigation to prevent and detect violations of the laws 
of the state). 
76. A. GERMANN, F. DAY & R. GALLATI, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 206 (1969). 
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are ineffective. Physical evidence may have disappeared; the 
crime scene may yield nothing of importance, making a search 
warrant· unnecessary; and the surveillan<::e of suspects is irrele-
vant if the child knows the identity of the perpetrator.77 In such 
cases, the interviews of the victim, witnesses, and the victim's 
family become much more important than in cases that do not 
involve sexual abuse. 78 
Police techniques for interviewing victims of all types of sex 
crimes have been criticized in recent years. In children's cases, 
the insensitivity and frequency of the interviews are the most 
often cited problems.79 Motivated in large part by the com-
plaints of adult rape victims that they have been revictimized by 
the investigative process,80 police departments have sought alter-
77. Compare State v. ·Garay, 453 So. 2d 1003 (La. App. 1984) (case based on the 
child's testimony about defendant whom she knew and the testimony of social workers in 
orphanage where the victim resided; no crime scene evidence or medical evidence; identi-
fication not in issue) and State v. Wrightington, 323 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1982) (child 
reported the incident to her mother who failed to act; five days later, the child informed 
a school counselor who told police; case based on circumstantial evidence not derived 
from police investigation) and Commonwealth v. Brenner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 465 
N.E.2d 1229 (1984) (indecent assault report made by a seven-year-old girl three to four 
months after the incident; case was based on a fresh complaint of child to mother, friend, 
and friend's mother) with State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. 1980) (complaint 
was made shortly after the incident; police search of the crime scene revealed physical 
evidence (tissues) and a medical exam of the victim showed anal intercourse had oc-
curred) and State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1984) (police interviews of 13-year-
old girl). . 
Often the police will retain the task of questioning the defendant, see, e.g., State v. 
· Bounds, 71 Or. App. 744, 694 P.2d 566 (1985), although the intervenor may do so in 
some circumstances, e.g., State v. Neblock, 75 Or. App. 587, 706 P.2d 1020 (1985) (social 
worker who received the complaint interviewed the child and then interviewed the al-
leged perpetrator; at trial, the defendant argued that the social worker's statement to 
him, saying that he had to take responsibility for his actions and get treatment, was a 
promise of treatment instead of incarceration in return for a confession). 
78. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, J. 
Soc. lssuEs, Summer 1984, at 125; Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48 
("[I]nvestigative interviewing is the most important component of the validation process. 
It . . . affords the best opportunity to collect pertinent information . . . [because in 
most cases,) there will be little or no physical evidence ... to support the allegation"). 
79. See J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 9-13 (discussing negative aspects 
of legal intervention and suggesting more sensitive techniques); V. DE FRANCIS, supra 
note 9, at 4 (stating that repeated police interviews and the fervor of investigators to 
apprehend the offender may cause little or no concern to be shown for the child victim); 
Porter, Blick & .Sgroi, Treatment of the Sexually Abused Child, in HANDBOOK, supra 
note 2, at 115-16 (skepticism by police and others in authority is- a problem for the 
child); Comment, Incest and the Legal System: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 673, 680-84 (1979); see also Graves & Sgroi, Law Enforcement and Child 
Sexual Abuse, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 321 (advising law enforcement officers how 
to conduct interviews with children, emphasizing establishing rapport, interviewing for 
facts, and° evaluating victims). 
80. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OuR WILL 364-66 (1975); Berger, Man's Trial, Wo-
man's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1977); see 
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natives to their traditional involvement in such sex crime inves-
tigations. One option has been to provide special training for of-
ficers who interrogate victims of sex crimes. 81 Other departments 
have elected to conduct a joint investigation or to defer to social 
service agencies, particularly where a child victim is involved.82 
Thus, in many cases, intervenors have become adjuncts or 
replacements for the police in this stage of the investigative 
process. 
Faced with the challenge of investigating allegations of child 
sexual abuse, experts in the field have developed guidelines to be 
followed.83 The focus differs markedly from the traditional po-
lice investigation-the statement of the victim and the investi-
gator's familiarity with theories about the dynamics of child sex-
ual abuse are the key factors.84 
Validation by the intervenor of a complaint of child sexual 
abuse often begins with an investigative interview with the child 
for purposes of both fact-finding and creating a therapeutic ef-
fect on the child. 811 The interview provides the opportunity to 
obtain the child's account of the sexual abuse and to allow the 
interviewer to observe and evaluate the child's demeanor.86 
also Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis 
Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 156 (1978); Resick & 
Jackson, Attitudes Toward Rape· Among Mental Health Professionals, 9 AM. J. COMMU-
NITY PSYCHOLOGY 481 (1981). 
81. E.g., Boerma, How to Overcome Barriers and to Develop Creative and Innovative 
Approaches in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in PAPERS FROM NATIONAL 
POLICY CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 35. 
82. For example, in State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985), the social worker 
acknowledged that she had conducted the investigation for the state. Id. at 154-55; see 
also J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 9-13; Graves & Sgroi, supra note 79, at 
310. 
83. E.g., Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 39-79; Sgroi, An Approach to Case 
Management, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 81. 
Certainly, in a traditional police investigation, interviews with the victim are of para-
mount importance. But with allegations of child sexual abuse, the other evidence nor-
mally found to support the claim is absent, and the investigator is forced to rely on his 
or her knowledge of the dynamics of sexual abuse as supporting evidence. This is analo-
gous to the use of modus operandi techniques. See infra note 92. 
84. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40; Sgroi, supra note 83, at 91. 
85. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48 (arguing that although the pri-
mary purpose of the interview is fact-finding, there will be a clinical effect on the child 
that can be either traumatic or therapeutic, so the interviewer should structure the inter-
view to be therapeutic). 
86. See id. at 69. Dr. Sgroi ·explains that in conjunction with the fact-finding task, the 
intervenor must assess the credibility of the child. In Dr. Sgroi's framework: 
(d]etermining the validity of an allegation of child sexual abuse is first and fore-
most a matter of belief. You either believe the child's story or you do not. If you 
require that there be corroboration of the child's story by physical evidence, wit-
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In conjunction with assessing the credibility of the child 
through his or her demeanor and response to questions, the in-
terviewer should review the child's account in light of the com-
monly described behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse. 87 
There must also be an analysis of the dynamics of abuse, includ-
ing the pattern of abuse, the behavior of the abuser, the possibil-
ity of multiple incidents over time, a progression of sexual activ-
ity, elements of secrecy, pressure or coercion by the abuser, and 
detailed descriptions of sexual behavior.88 There is no precise 
formula for measuring the existence of abuse based on these fac-
tors. 89 The presence or absence of one or more indicators is not 
conclusive, but is only one piece of evidence for the investigator 
to consider. 
Investigators have an immensely difficult task when the only 
pieces of evidence are the child's allegation and an account that 
fits a recognized pattern, unaccompanied by physical evidence or 
other factors to support the claim. In such cases, the conclusion 
that the allegation is founded rests in large part on factors that 
are not independently verifiable.90 More importantly, the inves-
Id. 
nesses, or a confession by the perpetrator, you will turn many cases into "non-
cases." 
87. The behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse include: (1) overly compliant be-
havior; (2) aggressive behavior; (3) pseudomature behavior; (4) hints about sexual activ-
ity; (5) sexually aggressive behavior or persistent and inappropriate sexual play with 
peers, toys, or themselves; (6) detailed and age-inappropriate understanding of sexual 
behavior; (7) early arrival and late departure from school; (8) poor peer relationships; (9) 
lack of trust; (10) nonparticipation in school and social activities; (11) inability to con-
centrate in school; (12) sudden drop in school performance; (13) extraordinary fear of 
males; (14) seductive behavior; (15) running away from home; (16) sleep disturbances; 
(17) regressive behavior; (18) withdrawal; (19) clinical depression; and (20) suicidal feel-
ings. Sgroi,Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40°41; see also R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, supra 
note 1, at 51-53; Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of Intra-
Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Development, in CHILD SEXUAL ABusE AND 
THE LAW 166, 171-72 (J. Bulkley 4th ed. 1983). 
88. Dr. Sgroi has summarized the dynamics of abuse as follows: 
Child sexual abuse nearly always involves a known perpetrator who uses nonvio-
lent means (pressure, persuasion, bribery) based on his or her position of power 
or authority to engage a child in sexual behavior. The sexual activity will proba-
bly begin with less intimate behavior (exposure, masturbation, fondling) and 
progress to various types of sexual penetration .... There will probably be multi-
ple episodes of sexual activity between the perpetrator and the child over time. 
The perpetrator is likely to pressure or persuade the child to keep their sexual 
activity a secret from others. The child is likely to maintain the secrecy over a 
long period of time . . . . 
Sgroi, supra note 83, at 89-90; see also Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, supra note 87, at 171; 
Conte, The Justice System and Sexual Abuse of Children, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 556, 557-
62 (1984). 
89. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40. 
90. Id. at 69. 
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tigator's judgment that the complaint is truthful takes on 
greater significance as the case proceeds through the criminal 
justice system, for that conclusion may singularly determine the 
case outcome. Such a result is especially likely where other evi-
dence at trial is minimal. 91 
The methods used by the child sexual abuse professional as 
investigator have been a marked departure from investigative 
methods of the past. The challenging, probing police officer, who 
exhibits skepticism toward the victim's account and seeks cor-
roboration of it through physical evidence, has been replaced by 
a person with an accepting, supportive demeanor, who may be 
satisfied that the complaint is validated if the child is believable 
and the account fits a recognized pattern of sexual abuse. More-
over, the use of the intervenor's judgment that a crime has been 
committed as evidence in the prosecution of the case is a signifi-
cant change as compared to the impact of an investigating of-
ficer's conclusion. Ordinarily, the police investigator is limited to 
fact-based testimony at trial, not opinion testimony that the 
crime occurred as the victim has alleged. 92 
The tenor of the investigation has changed as child sexual 
abuse professionals have become involved in the process. Inves-
tigation is but one of the tasks that the system has assigned 
them, however, and the intertwining of the investigative role 
91. E.g., State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D; 1985) (social worker gave her opinion 
that the child had gained his sexual knowledge from experience with the defendant). 
One problem that intervenors seem not to have addressed is the use of threats of crim-
inal prosecution. Many experts believe that the potential for prosecution is a powerful 
and effective inducement by which to obtain the defendant's cooperation in treatment. 
E.g., R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, supra note 1, at 53; J. SELINSKE, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE 
INTERVENTION WITH THE SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILD 16 (1980) (information paper pub-
lished by National Professional Resource Center for Child Abuse & Neglect); Sgroi, 
supra note 83, at 106-07; Skoler, supra note 45, at 47. If the ·intervenor has approached 
the investigation with the idea that the alleged perpetrator would not be prosecuted, but 
only given treatment, that might influence the degree of care the intervenor uses when 
conducting the investigation. 
92. A law enforcement officer may be qualified to give an expert opinion on certain 
issues-e.g. modus operandi-that would be beyond the experience of most jurors. E.g., 
United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1981). Ordinarily, that testimony is re-
stricted to a general description of methods and techniques, and does not include the 
officer's opinion on the credibility of specific witnesses in the case. Testimony on the 
dynamics of sexual abuse may be analogous to the law enforcement officer's description 
of modus operandi, but the addition of an opinion on credibility by the child sexual 
abuse intervenor is a significant departure from the limits of that testimony. Compare 
People v. McDaniels, 107 Cal. App. 3d 898, 902-05, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12, 14-16 (1980) with 
People v. Brown, 116 Cal. App. 3d 820, 827-29, 172 Cal. Rptr. 221, 224-25 (1981). See 
also Note, Police Expert Witnesses and the Ultimate Issue Rule, 44 LA. L. REV. 211 
(1983). 
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with their other functions should be explored to develop a full 
picture of their participation in child sexual abuse cases. 
2. Chronicler- Generally, statutes assign the duty to inves-
tigate allegations of child sexual abuse to a state agency. 93 As a 
practical matter, the intervenor conducts an extensive interview 
not only to discover the child's version of events,94 but also to 
transcribe it in some form for later use in the criminal process. 
Preserving the child's account may be by a method as sophisti-
cated as videotaping,911 or as mundane as written notes. 
The interviewer's version of the child's account may be used 
in pretrial proceedings or in the trial itself. 96 In many cases, the 
statement is repeated in front of a grand jury and at the prelimi-
nary hearing. Occasionally, the interviewer uses the child's state-
ment informally to convince the defendant to attend treatment 
or to enter a guilty plea. 97 At trial, the role of the interviewer in 
testifying about the child's statements will depend on the stat-
utes in the jurisdiction that admit hearsay and on the availabil-
ity of the child to testify. If admitted, the interviewer's testi-
mony may be offered in addition to other hearsay versions of the 
events in question or may be the sole account, depending on how 
the events were reported and investigated. 98 
a. Hearsay rules99- The statements of child witnesses in 
sexual abuse cases100 may fall under the residual exceptions to 
93. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-12 (1984); id. § 26-10-12.1 (Supp. 1986) (upon 
receipt of a report of child abuse, an investigation shall be made by the department of 
social services, the county sheriff, or the city police). 
94. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48-69 (providing detailed methodol-
ogy for interviewing an alleged victim of child sexual abuse). 
95. See supra note 6. 
96. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987) (statement made by the child "is ad-
missible in evidence in criminal proceedings"). The statements also may be used in other 
proceedings, such as dependent and neglected actions, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8-32.5 
(1984) or actions pursuant to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-10-1 (1984). 
97. See supra note 91. 
98. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text. . 
99. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Federal Rule of Evidence 802 establishes that 
hearsay is not admissible unless the Rules themselves authorize an exception or Congress 
or the Supreme Court so prescribes. In theory, hearsay evidence is excluded because it is 
unreliable and, in criminal cases, because it denies the defendant the right to confront 
his accuser. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 159 (1970); see also FED. R. Evm. art. VIII advisory committee's note; 5 J. WIGMORE, 
supra note 11, § 1367 (extolling the benefits of cross-examination of witnesses). See gen-
erally Bulkley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court Statement of 
Sexual Abuse at Trial, in CHILD SEXUAL .ABusE AND THE LAW, supra note 87, at 153. 
100. The challenge presented by child witnesses is not new. In his discussion of of-
fenses against persons, Blackstone instructs: 
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the hearsay rule101 or under other specific exceptions or exclu-
sions, 102 particularly res gestae,103 spontaneous exclamation,1°"' 
Moreover, if the rape be charged to be committed on an infant under twelve 
years of age, she may still be a competent witness, if she has sense and under-
standing to know the nature and obligations of an oath; or even to be sensible of 
the wickedness of telling a deliberate lie. Nay, though she hath not, it is thought 
by Sir Matthew Hale that she ought to be heard without oath, to give the court 
information; and others have held, that what a child told her mother, or other 
relations, may be given in evidence, since the nature of the case admits fre-
quently of no better proof. 
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *214. Blackstone concedes that such a proposal had 
not received wide acceptance in his day, and, in fact, hearsay testimony of the account of 
a child not competent to take an oath would not be permitted in such a situation. He 
advises that if a child is permitted to testify about such an offense, there "should be 
some concurrent testimony of time, place and circumstances, in order to make out the 
fact; and that the conviction should not be grounded singly on the unsupported accusa-
tion of an infant under years of discretion." Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 11, at 9. 
101. FED. R. Evm. 803(24) (declarant available); FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5) (declarant 
unavailable). The catchall exceptions to the hearsay rule were enacted to codify the dis-
cretion that judges had claimed over issues of admissibility before the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules provide that, where evidence i~ proffered, but does 
not fit into the specific categories delineated in Rules 803 and 804 as exceptions to the 
prohibition against hearsay, the judge is granted discretion to admit the testimony if it 
has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the listed exceptions. 
Then the court must determine that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a mate-
rial fact, (b) it is more probative on the point for which it was offered than any other 
evidence that the prosecution could secure through reasonable means, and (c) the gen-
eral purposes of the rules and the interests of justice would best be served by admission. 
The proponent must also give notice to the defendant of an intention to offer the hear-
say under a residual exception. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 
11 803(04]; Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978); see also State v. Bounds, 71 Or. 
App. 744, 694 P.2d 566 (1985) (holding that the mother's account of an unavailable four-
year-old child's statement was admissible under the residual exception); State v. Taylor, 
103 N.M. 189, 704 P.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that although part of a three-year-
old child's statement was admissible under the residual exception, identification of the 
defendant as perpetrator did not meet the tests for admissibility and must be excluded). 
102. Only about half of the states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those 
that have not adopted these rules rely on statutory or common law evidentiary principles 
to resolve questions of admissibility. In many instances, the common law rules overlap 
exceptions listed in the Federal Rules. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
See generally Graham, supra note 6, at 22. 
103. FED. R. Evm. 803(1), 803(3); see Sparks v. State, 172 Ga. App. 891, 324 S.E.2d 
824 (1984); State v. Garay, 453 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Jolly v. State, 681 
S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (mother's statement to her brother about abuse of her 
child). But see Commonwealth v. Kasko, 322 Pa. Super. 62, 469 A.2d 181 (1983) (holding 
that res gestae does not apply where the mother catches her child engaging in sexual 
contact with another child and interrogates them to find out who taught them about 
sex); State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). 
104. FED. R. Evm. 803(2) (excited utterances); see United States v. Iron Shell, 633 
F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 
448, 615 P.2d 720 (1980); State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan. App. 2d 353, 657 P.2d 79 (1983); 
State v. Ramos, 203 N.J. Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (1985); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 
337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985); State v. Bult, 351 
N.W.2d 731 (S.D. 1984); State v. Bouchard, 31 Wash. App. 381, 639 P.2d 761 (1982); 
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statement made for medical diagnosis, m or fresh complaint.106 
Although many courts· have relied on these provisions to admit 
children's statements, critics charge that they are inadequate for 
sexual abuse cases. Several commentators argue that the 
residual exceptions are unsatisfactory because (1) courts inter-
pret them to apply only in unusual cases; (2) they were not in-
tended· to create a new class of exceptions; and (3) courts still 
must make the determinations specified in the hearsay rule, so 
they will not necessarily admit the statements.107 Likewise, the 
specific exceptions listed in the hearsay rule have been found 
ineffective. 108 The language and the purpose of the exceptions 
have posed barriers to the admission of testimony in many cases, 
State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the 
victim's statements made three days after the assault were excited utterances). But see 
State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (finding that a time lapse of 
two to three hours and a lack of excitement preclude admission as spontaneous exclama-
tion); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984) (holding that a statement 
not made until the morning after the assault, compounded by leading questions by the 
mother, prevented admission as excited utterance; however, the statements were admis-
sible under the statutory child sexual abuse exception). 
105. FED. R. Ev10. 803(4); see United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(allowing victim's statement about injury and identity of a perpetrator who is a member 
of the same household on the theory that such statement is pertinent to the victim's 
treatment for psychological injury); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Honick v. Walden, 10 Md. App. 714, 272 A.2d 
406 (1971); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); State v. Bouchard, 31 
Wash. App. 381, 639 P.2d 761 (1982). But see Hassel v. State, 607 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1981) (holding that a statement was not admissible because it discussed the 
cause of the injuries, not the injuries themselves). 
106. Commonwealth v. Brenner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 465 N.E.2d 1229 (1984) (re-
port of seven-year-old girl to a friend three to four months after the incident); State v. 
Wrightington, 323 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1982); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545 (S.D. 
1971) (twelve-year-old victim; delay of 67 to 82 days between intercourse and the com-
plaint). Contra State v. Williams, 598 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). In Williams, 
the court held that a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation occurred where 
the child did not testify. The defendant and the stepfather both had access to the child 
during the time in question. Although the court admitted a fresh complaint through the 
mother's testimony, it concluded that details, including identification of the defendant as 
perpetrator, were not admissible under these circumstances. 
107. See McGrath & Clemens, The Child Victim As A Witness in Sexual Abuse 
Cases, 46 MONT. L. REV. 229 (1985); Skoler, supra note 45, at 8 (arguing residual excep-
tions are too strict for child sexual abuse cases); Note, supra note 45, at 1763. For a 
general discussion of the residual exceptions, see Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions 
to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
867, 905 (1982) (tracing the development and application of residual exceptions; arguing 
that they should not be used to expand hearsay rules and exceptions "beyond recogni-
tion"). But see Imwinkelried, supra note 101 (tracing the history and legislative intent of 
residual exceptions; arguing that the ambiguity of the language and intent justifies a 
broad interpretation). 
108. See McGrath & Clemens, supra note 107, at 234-35; Skoler, supra note 45, at 7 
(fitting sexual abuse within the traditional exceptions requires a strained interpretation 
of the exceptions); Note, supra note 45, at 1755 ("spontaneous exclamation" exception 
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although, in many others, the courts have given the rules an ex-
pansive interpretation in order to admit the evidence.109 
Recently, several states have adopted the suggestion that 
hearsay testimony in child sexual abuse cases be admitted pur-
suant to a specific rule. 110 This new exception has been in lieu 
treats children as if they were adults because it is built on the premise that they will 
have the psychology, behavior, and experience of adults, and will react accordingly). 
109. E.g., People v. Stewart, 39 Colo. App. 142, 568 P.2d 65, 68 (1977) ("Moreover, as 
regards sex crimes against children there is authority that the rule be applied more liber-
ally."); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86-90, 337 S.E.2d 833, 841-43 (1985) (approving a 
"broad and liberal" interpretation of what constitutes an excited utterance when applied 
to young children); State v. Ramos, 203 N.J. Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (1985); State v. 
Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985) (where the declarant is a young child, the mere lapse 
of time does not disqualify the statement as an excited utterance); see also 2 C. ToRCIA, 
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 300 n.31 (13th ed. 1972). 
110. A typical statute reads: 
STATEMENT OF SEX CRIME VICTIM UNDER AGE TEN. A statement made by a child 
under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact or rape performed with 
or on the child by the defendant, not otherwise admissible by statute or court 
rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings against the defendant in 
the courts of this state if: 
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, 
that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient in-
dicia of reliability; and 
(2) The child either: 
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or 
(b) Is unavailable as a witness. 
However, if the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be ad-
mitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. 
No statement may be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the 
statement makes known his intention to offer the statement and the particulars 
of it, including the name and address of the declarant[,) to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a 
fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987); see also WASH. REv. CoDE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 
1987). For a list of states that have adopted the exception, see supra note 5. See gener-
ally Note, Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative In-
novations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1985); Note, State v. McCafferty: The Conflict Between 
a Defendant's Right to Confrontation and the Need for Childrens' Hearsay Statements 
in Sexual Abuse Cases, 30 S.D.L. REV. 663 (1985); Note, Confronting Child Victims of 
Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. Pu-
GET SouND L. REV. 387 (1984); Note, Sexual Abuse of Children-Washington's New 
Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REv. 813 (1983). 
Kansas has enacted a different type of statute altogether. It creates an exception for 
the statements of a child in a criminal proceeding or in a proceeding to determine 
whether the child is deprived or in need of care. It reads: 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testify-
ing at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible except: ... (dd) In a criminal proceeding or in a pro-
ceeding pursuant to the Kansas juvenile offender's code or in a proceeding to 
determine if a child is a child in need of care under the Kansas code for care of 
children, a statement made by a child, to prove the crime or that the child is a 
juvenile offender or a child in need of care, if: (1) The child is alleged to be a 
victim of the crime or offense or a child in need of care; and (2) the trial judge 
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of, m or in addition to, a residual exception in the jurisdiction.112 
Such "child hearsay" statutes express a legislative intent that 
statements of young children that describe acts of sexual abuse 
and that meet the threshold requirements-the time, content, 
and circumstances of the statement must provide sufficient indi-
cia of reliability113-should be admitted at trial. These statutes, 
regardless of their efficacy, establish the ideological foundation 
for the admission of children's accounts of sexual abuse. 114 
b. Obtaining and using information- The child sexual 
abuse professional is one of many sources for obtaining informa-
tion about sexual abuse from a child. With the renunciation of 
this function by many law enforcement agencies, however, the 
finds, after a hearing on the matter, that the child is disqualified or unavailable 
as a witness, the statement is apparently reliable and the child was not induced 
to make the statement falsely by use of threats or promises. 
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to a jury, the 
trial judge shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight 
and credit to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it 
shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the 
circumstances under which the statement was made, any possible threats or 
promises that might have been made to the child to obtain the statement and 
any other relevant factor. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1986). See generally McNeil, The Admissibility of 
Child Victim Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense Perspectiue, 23 WASHBURN L. J. 265 (1984). 
-111. WASH. REv. CoDE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1987). 
112. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987) (child sexual abuse exception); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS §§ 19-16-28, 19-16-35 (1979) (residual exceptions). 
113. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 379 N.W.2d 295 (S.D. 1985), where the defendant 
was convicted of rape and sexual contact with his son. The state relied on the child 
hearsay exception, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38 (1987), to introduce statements of the 
child made to his mother and to a police officer. The state made an offer of proof of the 
contents of the statements. The defense was permitted to cross-examine the officer, but 
not the mother. The defense motion to exclude the statements was denied. Accordingly, 
the state offered them as substantive evidence in its case-in-chief. On appeal, the su-
preme court reversed and remanded, stating that the hearsay statute contemplates a 
trial court determination of the reliability of the statements, including an assessment of 
the age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of abuse, the relationship of 
the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertions, and the reliability of the child 
witness. 379 N.W.2d at 297. It may not simply issue a perfunctory denial of the defense 
motion to exclude without making the requisite findings. Id. at 298; accord State v. 
Spronk, 379 N.W.2d 312 (S.D. 1985). 
114. Courts generally have adopted the ideological foundation of these statutes. See, 
e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 22, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985) (declaring that a child's 
statements about sexual abuse are inherently reliable; children will not persist in lies 
about sexual abuse and do not have enough information about sexual matters to lie 
about them); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D. 1984) (concluding that a 
young child is unlikely to fabricate a graphic account of sexual activity because such 
activity is beyond the realm of the child's experience). 
Courts have not specifically relied on expert testimony at trial to support their justifi-
cations for finding the information reliable. Apparently, they have relied on their own 
research into child sexual abuse literature. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the courts' use of expert testimony. 
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child sexual abuse professional has become the most important 
official agent for discovering and preserving the child's account. 
Unofficial sources, such as parents and siblings, also are critical 
participants in the gathering of information about the events 
that may be used in court as hearsay testimony. In many cases, 
these unofficial sources obtain a preliminary account and the of-
ficial agent conducts a further investigation and questioning of 
the child. m It is important to keep in mind that the intervenor's 
function at this point is not only to investigate what happened, 
but also to preserve in some fashion the substance of the child's 
account for use in subsequent proceedings. 
In an effort to preserve the child's account accurately and 
completely, and to preclude challenges to the interviewer be-
cause of bias, several states have enacted legislation authorizing 
the videotaping of the interviews between the intervenor and 
child. 116 Such statutes anticipate that these tapes might be used 
at trial instead of or in addition to the child's testimony.117 In 
most jurisdictions, sophisticated recording methods may be an 
option, but are not employed routinely.118 The usual procedure 
is for the intervenor to conduct one or more interviews with the 
child to establish a relationship that will enable the child to con-
fide in the interviewer about the abuse.119 The interview or se-
ries of interviews then will be condensed into a narrative report 
that will be the source of the hearsay testimony given at trial. 
The function of gathering and preserving the child's account 
appears at first blush to fit neatly into the investigative service 
performed by the intervenor. The dual roles of investigator and 
hearsay recorder often have been accomplished by the same in-
dividual with little potential for undermining the goals of the 
115. See Sgroi, Blick & Porter, supra note 2, at 17-21 (describing the typical circum-
stances of the disclosure of abuse). 
116. See supra note 6. 
117. But cf. Graham, supra note 6, at 62-67 (arguing that videotaping creates not 
only confrontation issues, but problems with distortion and exclusion of evidence). 
118. Some child advocates have argued that technological innovations in child sexual 
abuse cases generally are not as effective as, for example, the use of the child sexual 
abuse hearsay exception. A videotaped deposition may place the child and defendant in 
close proximity without the judge being present, so the child's trauma may be increased. 
The child still may have to testify at trial. Whitcomb, supra note 8, at 18-21. 
Texas allows an ex parte videotaping session of the child's initial complaint, which in 
theory could also be used in the government's case at trial in place of the child's live 
testimony. TEx. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The statute has 
been held unconstitutional by one Texas court, Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1985), and constitutional by two others, Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). See 
Graham, supra note 6, at 63-67. 
119. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48-69. 
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adversary system or the integrity of the functions being per-
formed. This is not all the system demands of child sexual abuse 
intervenors, however; these individuals are expected to serve as 
experts120 and advocates121 as well. Potential problems become 
apparent when the interplay of the four roles is examined. If the 
expert and advocacy roles are combined to too large an extent, 
they will tend to overshadow the neutrality the adversary system 
asks of an investigator and recorder. 
3. Expert-122 As research into child sexual abuse has be-
come more sophisticated, prosecutors have developed creative 
ways to take advantage of such research at trial. If the facts of 
the case warrant it, 123 the government prosecutor will call an ex-
pert witness to describe the dynamics of child sexual abuse124 
and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, 1211 on the the-
ory the fact finder is not familiar with these concepts and the 
expert testimony will aid in its decision. In some instances, this 
testimony occurs in the government's case-in-chief;126 in others, 
it enters as rebuttal evidence127 or in response to cross-
examination.128 
120. See infra notes 122-52 and accompanying text. 
121. See irifra notes 176-93 and accompanying text. 
122. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
123. Expert testimony ordinarily is not needed if the physical evidence is conclusive 
or if other evidence exists so that the case is not simply the child's word against the 
defendant's. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
124. E.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-10 (Minn. 1984); see supra note 88. 
125. E.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-10 (Minn. 1984). See generally Sum-
mit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
177, 181 (1983). Dr. Summit explains that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome 
includes five categories: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommoda-
tion; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction. Categories 
(1) and (2) are preconditions to the occurrence of sexual abuse. The remaining three 
categories are consequences that will vary with each case. See infra notes 132-33, 135 
and accompanying text. 
126. See, e.g., State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983); State v. Middleton, 
294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) (testimony of county juvenile worker); State v. Maule, 
35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). 
127. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985) (finding error in 
admission of expert testimony in the case-in-chief rather than as rebuttal evidence); 
State v. Clark, 682 P.2d 1339 (Mont. 1984); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 
1186 (1984). 
128. E.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 
688 P.2d 326 (1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State v. 
Caulder, 75 Or. App. 457, 706 P.2d 1007 (1985); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 
P.2d 173 (1984). 
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a. Subject matter- Substantively, the testimony of the ex-
pert will include a brief summary of the professional research 
into child sexual abuse129 and will emphasize the factors that are 
important to the case at hand. Thus, if the case involves sexual 
abuse by a parent or someone in a parental role, the testimony 
may cover the influence of that relationship, especially over a 
young victim.130 The expert may relate that abuse takes place 
over time, that normally it is not just a single incident, 131 and 
that delays in reporting are common.132 The witness may state 
that it is usual for a child initially to deny the number of times 
he or she was assaulted because of feeling guilty, filthy, and 
afraid of upsetting the family. 133 In addition, experts generally 
comment that it is unusual for children to fabricate graphic ac-
counts of sexual activity134 and that often the children's stories 
129. E.g., D. FINKELHOR, supra note 2, at 53-72 (discussing factors relevant to describ-
ing the abusive experience); Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, supra note 87, at 171; Sgroi, Blick 
& Porter, supra note 2, at 12-34 (explaining dynamics of child sexual abuse encounters 
and profiling participants); see also Roe, supra note 65. 
The testimony of experts is not admitted without some restrictions. One area of con-
cern to courts is the use of statistics that identify the defendant as a member of a group 
statistically more likely to have committed child abuse. Generally, that evidence is not 
admissible. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984); State v. Claflin, 38 
Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984); State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 
(1983). 
130. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608-09 (Minn. 1984); State v. Maule, 
35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). For a detailed discussion of statistics on the 
likelihood of abuse, see D. FINKELH0R, supra note 3, at 23-32. 
131. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984); Maule, 35 Wash. 
App. at 289-90, 667 P.2d at 97. This raises the problem of the introduction of other acts 
of misconduct. Many courts liberally admit evidence of other acts of misconduct in cases 
involving sexual abuse of children. See, e.g., State v. Keithley, 218 Neb. 707, 358 N.W.2d 
76 (1984); State v. Thomas, 381 N.W.2d 232 (S.D. 1986); DeClouette v. State, 699 S.W.2d 
341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) 
(finding that in the prosecution of sexual abuse of a three-year-old, evidence that the 
defendant tried to entice a 13-year-old a week earlier was admissible, and noting that 
there is greater latitude in admitting evidence of other acts in sexual abuse cases to 
corroborate the victim's testimony against a credibility challenge). But see Weiner v. 
State, 55 Md. App. 548, 464 A.2d 1096 (1983) (holding that it was error for the state to 
introduce through the direct examination of complainant her sister's statement that de-
fendant had abused her). See generally Comment, Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the 
Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual Offense, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 217 (1985). 
132. See, e.g., Smith, 100 Nev. at 571, 688 P.2d at 327; People v. Benjamin R., 103 
A.D.2d 663, 668, 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (1984); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 453, 454, 706 
P.2d 1009, 1010 (1985); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566,569,683 P.2d 173, 176 (1984) 
(expert testified that delays exist in 50% of child sexual abuse cases and that the delay is 
longer if the victim knows the perpetrator); State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 852, 690 
P.2d 1186, 1190 (1984). 
133. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984); State v. Clark, 682 
P.2d 1339, 1351 (Mont. 1984). 
134. See, e.g., W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 177 (Colo. 1984); State v. Myers, 359 
N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. at 455, 706 P.2d at 1010; State 
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are inconsistent or confused. 1311 In some cases, there is a poor 
relationship between the mother and daughter, 136 a fear of 
men, 137 and a victim who experiences nightmares with assaultive 
content.138 The testimony may indicate that the victim often 
looks and acts older than he or she is, 139 and that the victims of 
child sexual abuse have an unusual amount of sexual knowledge 
for their age. uo Finally, the expert may testify about the ability 
of a child to perceive and to describe a sexual contact. 10 
The testimony of child abuse experts is not admitted without 
reservation. Some courts have expressed discomfort with admit-
ting testimony about child sexual abuse as a general phenome-
non because it distracts the jury from the facts of the case it is 
hearing. 1• 2 Other courts have commented that the scientific com-
munity has not yet generally accepted "validation"143 and other 
bases of the expert's testimony, so the testimony should not be 
allowed. 144 Nevertheless, when the child's account of abuse has 
v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. at 290, 667 P.2d at 97. But see State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 
(Iowa 1986) (holding that it was error for the state to introduce opinion evidence that 
young children do not lie about sexual abuse). 
135. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1984) (the child may be-
come confused when she feels it isn't right, but the adult says it is); State v. Caulder, 75 
Or. App. 457, 706 P.2d 1007 (1985). 
136. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984). See generally D. 
FINKELHOR, supra note 2, at 93-94, 120; Sgroi, Blick & Porter, supra note 2, at 28-29. 
137. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Mimi. 1984). 
138. Id.; see Tilelli, Turek & Jaffe, Sexual Abuse of Children: Clinical Findings and 
Implications for Management, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 319, 322 (1980). 
139. See, e.g., Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609; see also Sgroi, Blick & Porter, supra note 2, 
at 31. 
140. See, e.g., Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609; State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 453, 454, 706 
P.2d 1009, 1010 (1985) (expert commenting that a child victim of sexual abuse may act 
out sexually with others and may be highly curious about sexual anatomy). 
141. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191 
(1980), aff'd, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981) (the victim was an 11-year-old, mildly 
retarded girl; pediatrician testified about reality testing-how children see the world and 
fantasize-and concluded that the more limited the intelligence, the less ability there is 
to fantasize); State v. Padilla, 74 Or. App. 676, 704 P.2d 524 (1985). 
142. See Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985); State v. Maule, 35 
Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983). But see People v. Payan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct. 
App. 1985); State v. Dale, 75 Or. App. 453, 706 P.2d 1009 (holding that testimony about 
the "typical" victim of child sexual abu,se is permissible). 
143. For an explanation of the "validation" process, see supra note 63. 
144. See Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985). In Bussey, the prob-
lem was exacerbated because the child purportedly had been sexually abused by family 
members other than the defendant. The court declined to permit testimony on child 
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome because the expert was not able to link the 
child's secretiveness, fear, and guilt to abuse by the defendant. But see Payan, 220 Cal. 
Rptr. at 128-30 (rejecting the defendant's argument that child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome is not generally accepted in the medical community). 
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been impeached with prior inconsistent statements1n or chal-
lenged in cross-examination, the courts are more likely to admit 
the expert testimony on the dynamics of sexual abuse146 as re-
buttal evidence. 
If the court permits the expert to recite in general terms the 
types of conduct to look for in verifying a child sexual abuse 
complaint, it may then allow him or her to relate specific con-
duct in the complainant's case.147 Whether the expert then may 
offer an opinion that the child has been sexually abused is a 
question that has created difficulty for courts. At least one court 
has resolved the question by permitting the expert to give an 
opinion on the credibility of the child.146 
Some courts, although rejecting an outright opinion by the ex-
pert on credibility, have allowed the expert to give what is in 
essence such an opinion. Usually this opinion is couched in 
terms of the symptoms of child sexual abuse and how the dy-
namics of abuse operate to make the child appear less reliable 
then he or she is.149 The courts acknowledge that such commen-
145. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State 
v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983). 
146. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 579, 688 P.2d 326 (1984). 
147. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983). The literature 
indicates that a variety of symptoms might be indicators of child sexual abuse, but does 
not quantify which symptoms must be present to establish a case of abuse. In addition, 
because the symptoms listed are not necessarily the result of sexual abuse, the expert 
must make the inductive leap from the existence of symptoms to a conclusion that child 
sexual abuse occurred by incorporating other factors-for example, the child's complaint, 
the quality of the symptoms, or a combination of symptoms in one child. See Sgroi, 
Blick & Porter, supra note 2, at 10-27. 
148. State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 602, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1982). But see Roe, supra 
note 65, at 104 (opposing the introduction of expert opinion on credibility because of the 
potential adverse impact on child-victims resulting from repetitious accounts of the abu-
sive experiences and the possible inference that the child is mentally or emotionally 
impaired). 
Traditionally, the testimony of an expert on the credibility of a witness has not been 
allowed because credibility is a matter within the expertise of the jury. The theory be-
hind permitting such an opinion in a case of child sexual abuse appears to be the neces-
sity of demonstrating to the jury that the account is believable because it is in accord 
with symptoms that the expert would expect to find, and no other factors exist to rebut 
the claim of abuse. This provides a link that otherwise might be absent-the child's 
symptoms could be indicative of other problems or nothing at all, or the child could have 
fantasized the incident. See, e.g., Middleton, 294 Or. at 435-37, 657 P.2d at 1219-20. This 
theory overlooks the possibility that the expert is relying on his or her assessment of the 
child's credibility as part of the validation process. Thus this process "bootstraps" the 
expert's assessment into substantive evidence presented to the jury. 
149. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 (Minn. 1984); Middleton, 294 
Or. at 435-37, 657 P.2d at 1219-20. 
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tary has the effect of bolstering the child's credibility, but be-
cause it is only an indirect result, they are willing to accept it. 150 
Other courts have rejected this testimony altogether and have 
adhered to the traditional rule that expert opinion on the credi-
bility of a witness is not allowed. 151 These courts point out that 
credibility is the crucial question in many child sexual abuse 
cases and that the danger of unfair prejudice from the expert 
opinion outweighs its probative value. 152 They appear satisfied 
that the jury will have the ability to sort out and resolve ques-
tions of credibility without hearing the expert's conclusions that 
the child is believable. 
b. Assessment- Although the foregoing summarizes the 
courtroom treatment of expert testimony in cases of child sexual 
abuse, it by no means captures the depth and breadth of the 
influence of experts in such cases. Not only is their testimony 
presented to juries, but appellate courts have made liberal use of 
expert research on child sexual abuse in writing judicial opinions 
on the subject. 153 Thus, expert opinions have been used to deter-
mine the admissibility of children's hearsay statements,154 other 
acts of misconduct by the defendant, 155 and expert testimony 
itself. 156 
Despite the widespread impact of expert research and testi-
mony on child sexual abuse, the method of presentation of the 
150. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 609; Middleton, 294 Or. at 435-36, 657 
P.2d at 1219-20. 
151. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 
49-50 (1985); Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 403 N.E.2d 1191 (1980), 
aff'd, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981); State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 
(1983); see also Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the 
Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 431, 452-57 (1980) 
(discussing whether testimony by mental health professionals with respect to credibility 
should be limited by the scope of knowledge and experience). 
152. FED. R. Evm. 403; see, e.g., State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985); State v. 
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985) (holding that an expert witness 
generally may give an opinion on the ultimate issue, but not on the credibility of the 
victim; the opinion that the children were molested was, in essence, an opinion on their 
credibility because the physical evidence was inconclusive; it was improper for the expert 
to base an opinion on the ultimate issue solely on her determination of the witness's 
veracity). 
153. See, e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 21, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (1985); State v. 
Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436 n.9, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 n.9 (1983). Courts may utilize the 
primary literature as well as case law and law review articles when issuing judicial opin-
ions on child sexual abuse. 
154. See, e.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 163-64 (S.D. 1984); State v. 
Gitchel, 41 Wash. App. 820, 826-28, 706 P.2d 1091, 1095-96 (1985). 
155. See, e.g., Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (using 
expert's testimony in sex crimes involving children to corroborate the child's testimony 
and to negate inferences of fantasy, unreliability, or vindictiveness). 
156. See supra notes 129-41. 
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evidence may result in a superficial or sanitized version of abuse 
being presented to the fact finder. Normally, the gaps in data or 
theory on child sexual abuse that the experts themselves ac-
knowledge are ignored in the courtroom. m In addition, although 
the testimony focuses on the dynamics of child sexual abuse, the 
expert's opinion on how to respond to the abuse is not sought. 1118 
Although this is not unusual when mental health professionals 
testify in court, it does illustrate that the legal system seems to 
want only a part of the total picture the expert might offer. Fi-
nally, the intervenor's theoretical perspective and its influence 
on his or her description of child sexual abuse to the fact finder 
are rarely discussed. 1119 
Although there is no legal requirement that testimony of an 
expert include a thorough discussion of all theoretical issues in 
the field-and, ordinarily, theory discussion is limited160-child 
sexual abuse cases pose a unique problem. Coupled with the 
mechanics of the presentation of the evidence, the omission of 
theory discussion from the expert's testimony creates the erro-
neous impression that sexual abuse has a single and all-encom-
passing interpretation. The "mechanics" are more easily under-
stood when contrasted to the previously used method of 
submitting such testimony in child sexual abuse cases.161 
157. See, e.g., D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 221. 
158. If the expert proffers an opinion on how to respond to abuse, it may be ignored. 
See, e.g., S.B. v. State, 706 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). Ordinarily, the expert's 
opinion is developed as part of the overall assessment of the facts of the case and how 
best to deal with the problem. See D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 4, 201 (indicating that 
some intervenors emphasize family treatment programs that include reconciliation with 
the offender, while others emphasize criminal justice sanctions). 
159. The theoretical orientation of the intervenor may result in differing approaches 
to child sexual abuse cases. The most common orientations view child sexual abuse as 
either rape or as a symptom of family dysfunction. See D. FINKELHOR, supra note 3, at 4. 
160. The purpose of theory discussion is to assist the jury in determining how much 
weight to give the expert's practical conclusions. 
161. An additional adjunct to the role of psychiatrists, see infra notes 162-64 and 
accompanying text, was the performance of a psychiatric evaluation of the victim of the 
alleged crime. This was in keeping with Wigmore's exhortation that females who claimed 
they had been raped or abused should not be believed and should be examined by a 
psychiatrist to determine whether they were telling the truth or merely fantasizing. 3A J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 924(a), at 736-37. But see Comment, Psychiatric Examina-
tions of Sexual Assault Victims: A Reevaluation, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1982) (as-
sessing a California statute eliminating the use of court-ordered psychiatric evaluations 
of victims of sex crimes; concluding that the statute strikes the proper balance between 
victims' rights and defendants' rights). 
In some respects, the role of the expert in child sexual abuse cases is similar to that 
urged by Wigmore-that is, the expert is called upon to testify that the victim is being 
truthful or that the acts described are consistent with the dynamics of sexual abuse. See 
Roe, supra note 65, at 108-11. 
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Prior to the recent increase in the use of expert testimony, 
mental health professionals, particularly psychiatrists, were the 
experts of choice in child sexual abuse cases. 162 In keeping with 
their role in most criminal prosecutions, the mental health pro-
fessionals usually assessed the defendant's mental state at the 
time of the criminal· behavior to see if he or she was responsible 
for it, 163 the mental state at the time of examination to see if he 
or she was competent to stand trial, and perhaps the person's 
potential for future dangerousness. 164 Controversy surrounded 
One major difference in the performance of this role by the expert appears to be an 
ideological one. As Finkelhor has noted, the Freudian influence on psychiatrists was one 
of the major impediments to the recognition of child sexual abuse as reality. With the 
increase in mental health intervenors who reject Freud's premises about sexual abuse, 
experts may be less skeptical and become more of an ally than an adversary to the child. 
See D. F1NKELHOR, supra note 3, at 11; infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text. 
162. An in-depth discussion of the role of psychiatry in defining and responding to 
the problem of child sexual abuse appears in Weisberg, The "Discovery" of Sexual 
Abuse: Experts' Role in Legal Policy Formulation, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1984); see 
also Oliver, The Mentally Disordered Sex Offender: Facts and Fictions, 3 AM. J. FOREN· 
SIC PSYCHIATRY 87 (1982-1983). 
163. Dr. Alan Stone has offered an insightful analysis and critique of the psychia-
trist's performance of these functions in A STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW (1976). In 
brief, the legal system required the psychiatrist to examine the defendant's functioning 
in the past, present, and future. The demand to look backward to explain the defend-
ant's state of mind and to look forward to make predictions about future conduct were 
responsibilities that many psychiatrists shouldered. Others, claiming that the expertise 
of a psychiatrist lay in explaining present and immediate past behavior, not behavior in 
the distant past or future, argued that the legal system was requiring what could not be 
accomplished. 
Dr. Stone and other authors also have pointed out that asking psychiatrists to make 
decisions about the defendant's responsibility for a crime is, in reality, a moral judgment 
that society should not delegate to them because their expertise in the mental health 
area does not necessarily aid them in making those kinds of judgments. Cf. id. at 218-30 
(discussing this theory in the context of the insanity defense); D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY 
AND LAW 3-11 (1980). See generally w. BROMBERG, THE USES OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW 
(1979); J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed. 1981). 
Congress apparently has adopted that viewpoint in enacting the most recent amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Evidence 704, which reads: 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of 
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether 
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are 
matters for the trier of fact alone. 
The rule change eliminates the need for the psychiatrist to make the "leap" from an-
swering a medical question to answering a question concerning free will and responsibil-
ity under the law. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 1J 704(03); see also Appel-
baum, The Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1984); 
Bazelon, The Role of the Psychiatrist in the Criminal Justice System, 6 BULL. AM. AcAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 139 (1978). 
164. Courts have recognized the fragile ground on which predictions of future con-
duct rest, but apparently see no way to avoid requiring such predictions. E.g., Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278-79 (1984); Estelle 
v. Smith 451 U.S. 454, 472-73 (1981). Congress incorporated the requirement of a predic-
524 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
the psychiatrists who tried to perform these functions for the 
system. Frequently, in attempting to comply with the system's 
demands, psychiatrists found themselves in disputes with their 
colleagues as "battles of the experts" developed over these is-
sues. 1611 The battles took the form of testimony from equally 
qualified psychiatrists who would present disparate and irrecon-
cilable points of view on the questions posed in the case. Resolu-
tion of the contradictions was left to the fact finder. 166 
In child sexual abuse trials, the battle of the experts rarely 
occurs. In the typical case, the prosecutor will introduce expert 
testimony to describe the phenomenon of child sexual abuse. 
The defense generally does not offer a contradictory version. 167 
More importantly, the expert for the prosecution may have dis-
cussed the allegation with the child and validated the claim of 
abuse.168 The courts ordinarily deny defense experts access to 
the child unless· some special showing of need is made. 169 
In conjunction with the elimination of professional dispute in 
a case, courts have revised the questions the experts are ex-
pected to answer. Courts no longer ask the expert to step into 
the defendant's mind to explain his or her conduct at the time 
of the crime. Instead, courts want the expert to describe ~eneral 
tion of future dangerousness into the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 .U.S.C. § 3142(b) 
(Supp. Ill 1985); see also Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the "Dangerousness" of "Normal" 
Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523 (1980); Levine, The Concept of Dangerousness: 
Criticism and Compromise, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 147 (B. Sales ed. 
1977). 
165. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 11 702(04]; see also FED. R. Evrn. 
704(b) advisory committee's note. 
166. See Morris, Bozzetti·, Rusk & Read, Whither Thou Goest? An Inquiry Into Ju-
rors' Perceptions of the Consequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 14 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1058, 1074-75 (1977). 
167. Defendants who have tried to introduce a contradictory version of the phenome-
_non of child abuse have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 
353-54 (Utah 1985). In Miller, the defendant attempted to offer the expert testimony of 
a clinical psychologist to describe the typical psychological profile of individuals who 
sexually abuse children. The testimony was excluded because it was speculative and 
would have shifted the jury's attention to whether the defendant fit the pattern, and 
away from the issue of whether he committed the crime. See supra note 142 and accom-
panying text; see also Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1984). 
168. E.g., Colgan v. State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Kim, 64 
Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984); State v. 
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985). 
169. E.g., State v. Sullivan, 360 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that a 
psychiatric exam to determine the child's competency is within the discretion of the trial 
court); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 155-56 (S.D. 1985) (psychiatric examinations of 
complaining witnesses in sexual offense cases may be ordered upon a substantial showing 
of need; the purpose of such an examination is to detect mental or moral delusions or 
tendencies that would distort complainant's imagination and affect credibility); State v. 
McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984). 
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patterns of abuse so the jury can decide whether the substance 
of the child's· account fits those patterns.170 The focus is com-
pletely different in such a case: it is on the child-victim, not the 
defendant. The mental health professional is not interviewing 
someone to see if he or she has a mental disease or defect as a 
prerequisite to deciding whether the person was responsible for 
past actions. Instead, the expert is interviewing a presumptively 
mentally-healthy person to see whether he or she was the victim 
of a crime. This eliminates many of the potential impediments 
that exist when a psychiatrist examines the alleged off ender in a 
criminal case. 
Analyzing the differences between the role of psychiatrists and 
the role of child sexual abuse professionals in cases, it appears 
that the controversial aspects171 of the medical model have dis-
appeared. Battles of the experts will neither consume court time, 
nor confuse the jury. The burden associated with a post hoc de-
termination of the defendant's state of mind has decreased; with 
child sexual abuse, the professional merely asks the child about 
events and validates the complaint. Thus, when these specific 
factors are considered, it is likely that child sexual abuse profes-
sionals will escape the criticism experienced by their psychiatric 
counterparts. 
But in eliminating the controversy, has the legal system lost 
more than anticipated? Streamlining the process to dispose of a 
second point of view and framing questions the professional 
feels capable of answering may be deceptive in their simplicity. 
Despite the problems associated with the medical model, it 
fits reasonably well within the adversary system in the sense 
that there is a testing of experts by both sides in the case.172 
170. See supra notes 129-52 and accompanying text. 
171. See A. STONE, supra note 163; J. ZISKIN, supra note 163; see also Bonnie & 
Slobogin, supra note 151. 
172. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Court held that when 
a defendant makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is 
likely to be a significant factor at trial, the state must provide access to a psychiatrist on 
this issue. The psychiatrist conducts an examination of the defendant and "assist[s) in 
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." Id. at 83. In reaching this de-
cision, the Court commented that meaningful access to justice by the defendant is re-
quired to ensure the proper functioning of the adversary process. Id. at 77. In the con-
text of a case where the state has made the defendant's mental condition at the time of 
the offense relevant, the assistance of a psychiatrist "may well be crucial to the defend-
ant's ability to marshal his defense." Id. at 80. The Court pointed out that psychiatrists 
may disagree about a diagnosis of mental illness because psychiatry is· not an exact sci-
ence. But the adversary system anticipates that: 
By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior, 
and other information, interpreting it in light of [the psychiatrists'] expertise, 
and then laying out their investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psy-
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Even if this probing establishes that there is neither a single ver-
sion nor a simple answer, it is clear that both parties to a dis-
pute have the opportunity to press their arguments to achieve 
their desired result. This benefit of traditional psychiatric testi-
mony is lacking in most adjudications of child sexual abuse. 
Even though the inquiry has shifted from the state of mind of 
the defendant to the account given by the child, the issue of the 
child's credibility still remains important.173 Child sexual abuse 
cases now incorporate a presumption of truth on the part of the 
child.174 Although that presumption may be appropriate in cer-
tain cases, such a system overlooks the need for courts not 
merely to have the expert employ a presumption, but make a 
judgment about credibility as well. Courts want the child sexual 
abuse professional to defer a decision about credibility until the 
case is evaluated and to make that judgment based on the facts 
in the specific case, not on cases· in general. 1711 Ignoring that de-
mand allows the professional to reach early, uninformed conclu-
sions and to perpetuate them during the remaining process of 
resolving the case. 
Allowing experts to be tested in court and disallowing the pre-
sumption that the child is telling the truth will promote sys-
chiatrists for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination 
of the truth on the issue before them. 
Id. at 81. 
173. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text. 
17 4. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also supra note 5. 
175. The intervenors' use of the presumptions discussed in the professional literature 
is illustrative. For example, in State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986), the govern-
ment called as witnesses the principal of the alleged victim's elementary school and a 
child abuse investigator. Both testified that children generally tell the truth when they 
report that they have been sexually abused. The first witness stated that she learned of 
statistics on this issue at training sessions and that, in particular, the statistics from one 
county indicated that of 75 cases prosecuted, only one involved a child who was not 
telling the truth. Id. at 92. The second witness stated that in her 16 years of working 
with abused children only one had lied to her about sexual abuse. She added that statis-
tics from the Giaretto Program in San Jose, California revealed that only about one in 
2500 children did not tell the truth. Id. The use of statistics to prove guilt has been 
criticized in other contexts. See supra note 129. 
More importantly, the use of the presumption that the child is not lying can create 
problems when we ask the intervenor to evaluate the case at hand. Employing a pre-
sumption eliminates the need even to consider alternative explanations, though ulti-
mately they might be rejected. It fosters conclusions based on what is familiar without 
close scrutiny of the facts at hand. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
See also State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984), Record of Remand Hearing 
107-09, where the trial judge quizzecl' the defense psychiatrist about whether he believed 
the state supreme court pronouncement that children rarely lie about sexual abuse. The 
psychiatrist responded that although as a general proposition that might be true, the 
facts and circumstances of each incident have to be examined to see if the generalization 
is true in that case. 
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temic integrity as well as avoid a vulnerability of child sexual 
abuse professionals. This vulnerability manifests itself when the 
intervenor performs not only the roles of expert and investiga-
tor, but also those of advocate and supporter of the child. The 
interdependence of these roles, and the lack of an adversarial 
process, create the potential for overreaching without meaning-
ful checks in the process. The import of this is more clearly ap-
parent when considering the extent of the professional's advo-
cacy role. 
4. Advocate/therapist- The relationship between the inter-
venor and the child-victim takes a variety of forms. As seen in 
the case law, the professionals most often involved in child sex-
ual abuse cases are (1) those who are given a statutory duty to 
investigate child maltreatment178 and (2) those who are in a 
therapist-patient relationship with the child.177 The profes-
sional-child relationships of the two groups differ significantly in 
theory, but, in practice, they can merge in ways that are impor-
tant to the criminal justice system and its handling of these 
cases. In effect, the nontherapist intervenor inay assume the role 
of advocate, which in turn becomes the functional equivalent of 
the professional therapist's role. 
a. Advocate- The intervenor may assume the role of advo-
cate for the child, even where neither statute nor professional 
position imposes that duty. Pressures from society and from 
other child sexual abuse professionals may require this of the 
intervenor.178 
In its narrow sense, the advocacy role exists as an extension of 
the intervenor's participation in child sexual abuse cases.179 The 
176. See supra note 75. 
177. E.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State v. 
Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983). 
178. Professional literature advising intervenors how to validate cases cautions them 
not to adopt the role of advocate or to jump to conclusions. J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 
10; Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40. Yet the literature in general fosters that 
approach. See Conte & Berliner, Sexual Abuse of Children: Implications for Practice, 62 
Soc. CASEWORK 601, 604-06 (1981); see also J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 10-11. 
Many authors have recognized the difficulty in divorcing oneself from personal ideolo-
gies when called upon to evaluate a situation objectively, see Bonnie & Slobogin, supra 
note 151, at 512-14, and have recommended procedures to minimize that influence. See 
infra notes 231-42 and accompanying text for suggested ways of enhancing expert objec-
tivity. See also J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 3 (stating that pressures on the social 
worker, rescue fantasies, and the emotion-laden character of child sexual abuse can trig-
ger various emotional reactions by intervenors). 
179. This is in contrast to the advocacy role in its broad sense, that also may affect 
an intervenor's approach to child sexual abuse cases. For exaniple, social workers, who 
serve as intervenors in many child sexual abuse cases, have a tradition of both advocacy 
for an individual client and advocacy for a class of people who are "social victims." In 
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intervenor participates in every stage of the victim's treatment 
and preparation for trial. It is the intervenor who listens to the 
victim's account of sexual abuse, offers personal support, and 
provides needed services. 180 The professional also acts as the vic-
tim's advocate by consulting with prosecutors on how to resolve 
the case and by assisting the victim with confusing legal proce-
dures.181 At trial, the intervenor will testify as an expert182 and 
will provide the child's account to the fact finder183 to achieve 
vindication for the individual child. 
The performance of the advocacy function has appeal partly 
because it reverses the past tendency to "revictimize"18' the 
child while resolving his or her case. It indicates to the child that 
responsible adults believe the claim of abuse and are willing to 
help.1811 The intervenor's service as an advocate, however, is 
troubling. When the investigative process begins, the system 
asks the intervenor to question the child in order to validate the 
claim. At the same time, the system asks the intervenor to en-
sure that the interview has a therapeutic effect on the child and 
that the child understands that the interviewer believes and 
one role, the social worker supports, advises, and, if need be, represents the individual 
client in dealing with the social organizations that affect his or her life. In the other role, 
the social worker focuses on systemic reforms to alleviate the victimization of the partic-
ular class of people. In many cases, the two advocacy roles will overlap. 
This model of the advocacy function appears to have been adopted by child sexual 
abuse intervenors, regardless of whether they are social workers. The social advocacy role 
is one that many child sexual abuse professionals have embraced in an effort to change 
the system's handling of these cases. The professionals have been among the most influ-
ential groups seeking legislative reform in the criminal justice system to accommodate 
child abuse cases. They have drawn the attention of the public to the scope and dynam-
ics of the problem and have worked to eliminate the myths about it. They have endeav-
ored to develop creative ways of rehabilitating offenders and strengthening their families, 
or in the alternative, to ensure punishment for offenders where appropriate. E.g., D. 
FINKELHOR, supra note 2. 
The philosophy of advocacy has been incorporated into the National Association of 
Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics. Section F of the Code states that the social 
worker's primary responsibility is to clients, and § Fl declares that "[t]he social worker 
should serve clients with devotion, loyalty, determination, and the maximum application 
of professional skill and competence." Section P encourages the social worker to promote 
the general welfare of society, including, in accordance with § PG, advocating "changes in 
policy and legislation to improve social conditions and to promote social justice." NASW 
CODE OF ETHICS (July 1, 1980). See also Ad Hoc Comm. on Advocacy, The Social Worker 
as Advocate: Champion of Social Victims, Soc. WORK, Apr. 1969, at 16; Paul, A Frame-
work for Understanding Advocacy, in CHILD ADVOCACY WITHIN THE SYSTEM 11 (J. Paul, 
G. Neufeld & J. Pelosi eds. 1977). 
180. See Sgroi, supra note 83, at 97-108. 
181. J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 16-17. 
182. See supra notes 122-52 and accompanying text. 
183. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text. 
184. J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 10. 
185. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 60. 
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supports him or her.188 Although it is not usually acJmowledged, 
there may be difficulty in maintaining a friendly, therapeutic, 
and supportive relationship with the child while engaging in an 
investigative process that necessitates asking diffic~lt questions 
to test the reliability of the child's account.187 If probing these 
issues will disrupt the supportive nature of the encounter, the 
advocate-intervenor may be less willing to press the child for an-
swers. Likewise, the advocate's inability to hear anything but a 
consistent or believable statement from the child188 may influ-
ence the intervenor's function of chronicling the child's ac-
count.189 Finally, when the interviewer testifies as an expert at 
trial or advises criminal justice personnel about the proposed 
disposition of the case, the advocacy function may shape his or 
her statements to make them consistent with the information 
gleaned from the child. 190 
Though elusive, one goal of the investigative process is to en-
sure that, on some level, it is conducted by someone neutral. 
Likewise, experts and hearsay witnesses preferably should have 
no personal stake in the outcome of the criminal proceeding that 
could bias their work.181 Once advocacy exists as an extension of 
186. Id. at 48, 60. 
187. J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 2-4 (a protective service worker may feel ambiva-
lent about the "conflicting roles of helper and investigator"); cf. Weil, Research on Issues 
in Collaboration Between Social Workers and Lawyers, 56 Soc. SERV. REV. 393 (1982) 
(discussing the conflicting roles of a· social worker when corroborating with attorneys). 
188. See generally C. LEVY, Soc1AL WORK ETHICS (1976). Levy notes that the social 
worker has considerable power in dealing with the client. Use of such power to serve the 
client's interest may !ead him or her to proceed "with a self-righteous lack of restraint" 
and may be an abuse of power. Id. at 77. He cautions social workers to address their 
attitudes-favorable or not-toward clients so they can serve them properly. Id. at 123-
27. Excessive identification with the clients may be a hindrance and may have detrimen-
tal effects on third parties who are in a position_ to be adversely affected by the social 
worker's judgments. Id. at 136, 150; see also Krell & Okin, Countertransference Issues in 
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 5 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 5 (1984). 
189. See supra notes 94-119 and accompanying text. 
190. This problem may occur because of the requirement that the professional "vali-
date" the complaint, at least in part, based on his or her familiarity with the dynamics of 
sexual abuse. Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 40, 70. In addition, the behavioral 
indicators of abuse vary and may be contradictory, so the intervenor has to employ his or 
her professional judgment to reach a conclusion that abuse did or did not occur. Id. at 
40-41. Validation is not a "neat" process-experts recognize the difficulty of piecing to-
gether the child's account. See supra text accompanying notes 129-41. Many cases can-
not be resolved conclusively. Sgroi, Child Sexual Assault: Some Guidelines for Interven· 
tion and Assessment, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, supra note 2, 
at 140. 
191. The preference for an unbiased expert clearly is just a preference, not a prereq-
uisite to the expert's testifying. E.g., Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171, 1174 
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a witness who is employed by a party is not precluded from 
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the investigative/expert/chronicler functions, the possibility of 
neutrality diminishes considerably. 
Admittedly, in many circumstances, neither investigators nor 
experts are neutral. 192 The inconsistent functions that the sys-
tem asks the professionals in child sexual abuse cases to per-
form, however, go far beyond an occasional overlapping of roles. 
In its endeavor to address the problem of abuse, the system has 
determined that these professionals can perform many roles. 
Professionals have taken on these responsibilities without full 
consideration of whether the roles might conflict or whether the 
method of performing one role might undercut the proper per-
formance of another.193 
The multiplicity of functions performed by child sexual abuse 
professionals is by no means part of a sinister endeavor to dis-
rupt the criminal justice process. They are doing exactly what 
the system asks them to do. The burden lies not only on these 
professionals, but also on others in the legal system to examine 
the implications of performing potentially conflicting tasks to 
see what problems are created and what solutions are available. 
b. Therapist- In theory, the duties of the therapist differ 
markedly from those of other intervenors in child sexual abuse 
cases. The therapist's duty is to help the child, regardless of the 
validity of the complaint of sexual abuse.10" The therapist ad-
dresses the myriad consequences of abuse experienced by the 
child-victim through individual therapy, group therapy, or other 
appropriate treatment. 10& 
testifying as an expert). See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 
11 702[04]. 
192. E.g., Gorman, Are There Impartial Psychiatric Witnesses?, 11 BULL. AM. AcAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 379 (1983). 
193. One indicator of the ability of intervenors to adequately perform the tasks as-
signed them is the number of successful lawsuits that have challenged their handling of 
sexual abuse cases. Comparatively few such suits have been brought. See D. BEsHAROV, 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY IN CHILD WELFARE WORK: THE GROWING TREND 15 (1983) 
(citing Martin v. Weld, 598 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1979), and Hale v. City of Virginia Beach, 
Fed. Dist. Ct., Eastern Dist. of Va., Norfolk Div., Civ. S0-151-N); see also Silas, Would a 
Kid Lie?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 17 (reporting on multimillion-dollar civil suits filed 
against prosecutor, county officials, and therapists involved in child sexual abuse cases in 
Jordan, Minn.). Loss of insurance coverage is another potential problem with the deliv-
ery of services in these cases. 
194. See People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1097, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985); 
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 244, 681 P.2d 291, 296, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 (1984). 
195. See Porter, Blick & Sgroi, supra note 79, at 109: See generally Rosenberg, The 
Psychologist in Court Proceedings Involving Children, in ADVOCATING FOR CHILDREN IN 
THE COURTS 264-93 (National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & Protection 
ed. 1979). 
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In practice, the legal system may call upon the therapist to 
perform other functions as well. Because the diagnosis of the 
complainant is an initial step in preparing a treatment plan, 
prosecutors have sought to use the therapist's conclusions about 
abuse as substantive proof of its existence.196 Likewise, they 
have endeavored to use the therapist as an expert in the case.197 
In this respect, the therapist performs roles similar to those of 
other, nontherapist intervenors. 
Because in theory the therapist's role is to "help" the child, at 
least one court has taken steps to limit the roles the therapist 
may perform at trial. 198 The limitation precludes the therapist 
from presenting fact-based conclusions to the fact finder. Thus, 
if the therapist determined the facts of the case with virtually 
the same information that will be presented to the fact finder, 
his or her conclusions about those facts will not be admitted. 199 
The therapist may discuss child sexual abuse in general, but 
may not introduce his or her diagnosis about the particular case 
as a matter of substantive evidence. 200 
C. Impact of the Intervenor's Approach 
The courts in Roscoe and Logue sensed some of the potential 
problems with the role of the professional in child sexual abuse 
cases. 201 The Roscoe court responded to these concerns by 
prohibiting the intervenor from giving an opinion on whether 
the child had been molested if that intervenor had (1) developed 
a therapeutic relationship with the child that created a duty to 
help him or her and (2) based the opinion on information de-
rived from the therapeutic relationship. 202 The Logue court dis-
allowed similar testimony not because of the existence of a ther-
apeutic relationship but rather because the opinion, given in the 
196. See Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50; Colgan v. 
State, 711 P.2d 533 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
197. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1098, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 45. 
198. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985); State v. Logue, 
372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985); see supra notes 55-60, 62, 65-69 and accompanying 
text. 
202. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1098-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50; see supra notes 
55-60, 62 and accompanying text. 
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language of expert testimony and not supported by scientific 
data, was unfairly prejudicial.203 
One problem presented by these cases is that a type of thera-
peutic relationship-one in which the intervenor sees himself or 
herself with a duty to help the victim-exists in virtually all 
child sexual abuse cases where the intervenor personally assists 
the child. The "therapeutic" aspect of the role may be more akin 
to advocacy,20• and although it may not exist by virtue of a stat-
utory duty, it permeates the case nevertheless. Although the 
courts have focused on the presence of a formal, therapeutic re-
lationship, the multiplicity of roles played by an expert in the 
case may be equally problematic as the courts endeavor to sort 
out potential conflicts of interest and misuses of experts. Thus, 
in Logue, where the social worker investigated the complaint, 
obtained the hearsay account, testified as an expert based pri-
marily on her decision that the child's statement was believable, 
and served in a supporting role for the child,20~ the court should 
have examined the manner in which she participated in the case 
as an additional basis for assessing the probative value of her 
testimony. 
Problems emerge, however, when some of the goals of the ad-
versary system206 are evaluated in light of the actual handling of 
child sexual abuse cases. The idea of an intervenor serving as a 
therapist/advocate and also as an expert witness on behalf of the 
client seems peculiar in a system that expects neutral witnesses 
to submit to testing and probing. In a similar vein, when the 
expert is also the investigator, chronicler, and advocate for the 
child, confidence in impartiality and scrutiny of the evidence 
diminishes. 207 
When searching for ways to diffuse authority and responsibil-
ity for the resolution of child sexual abuse cases, it is useful to 
examine some of the mechanisms already in place in the system. 
The use of a court-appointed expert208 to implement a "team 
203. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157; see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
205. Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 154, 156, 159; State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 {S.D. 
1984), Record of Remand at 246-48 {Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter Record of Remand] 
{copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.) 
206. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
207. Id. 
208. The defendant has the option of employing his own expert to perform the func-
tions described herein. If the defendant elects to do so, the defense expert would func-
tion in the same manner as any other party's expert. 
The rationale for seeking a court-appointed expert is that the performance of multiple 
or poorly-defined roles may result in the intervenor reaching unreliable conclusions that 
will be perpetuated throughout the case. This undermines the proper working of the 
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approach"209 to child sexual abuse cases has the most potential 
for relieving the problem of multiple or ill-defined functions and 
enhancing the benefits of the adversary process. 
Ill. PROPOSAL 
When the government seeks to introduce the testimony of an 
expert or intervenor in a child sexual abuse case, 210 upon motion 
of the defense, the court should determine whether the individ-
ual has the same relationship with the child as did the psycholo-
gist in People v. Roscoe, 211 or its functional equivalent. The 
court should inquire (1) whether the proposed witness has a 
therapist-patient relationship with the child or (2) whether the 
individual has assumed the equivalent of that relationship indi-
rectly as an extension of the advocacy function. 
Upon finding a therapist-patient relationship,212 the court has 
several options. The court could prohibit the expert from testi-
fying about his or her diagnosis of the child-as it did in Ros-
coe-but allow the expert to testify about child sexual abuse 
based on the professional literature and experience. Alterna-
tively, if the intervenor assumes the role of the child's advocate, 
which precipitates an informal, therapist-patient relationship, or 
if the intervenor performs multiple functions that could under-
mine the reliability of any one of those functions, there are two 
options. First, the court could follow the lead of Roscoe, allowing 
testimony about child sexual abuse in general, if the intervenor 
is qualified to give such information, and preventing any testi-
mony on the intervenor's conclusions about the specific child or 
adversary process, so the response of the system should not be couched in adversary 
terms. That is, if the process itself has been impeded, responding in an adversary man-
ner may not be an effective means of exposing the unreliability that the system has 
fostered. 
209. See J. BULKLEY & H. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 18; THE CHILD PROTECTION 
TEAM HANDBOOK (B. Schmitt ed. 1978); J. SELINSKE, supra note 91, at 4; Boerma, supra 
note 81, at 34; Cramer, The District Attorney as a Mobilizer in a Community Approach 
to Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 209, 211 (1985); see also Sgroi, Multidis-
ciplinary Team Review of Child-Sexual-Abuse Cases, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 
335; infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
210. As a practical matter, expert testimony as rebuttal evidence is given wider defer-
ence by the courts. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State 
v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). If, however, the proposed expert or 
intervenor has performed multiple or poorly-defined functions in the case and, thus, has 
created the potential for misuse of the testimony, the approach discussed herein should 
be employed to try to limit or exclude the evidence. 
211. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985). 
212. See infra text accompanying note 247. 
534 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
the factors supporting his or her c.onclusions because they are 
the functional equivalent of a therapist's diagnosis. Second, the 
court could appoint an independent expert to ascertain whether 
the intervenor's conflicting roles tainted any conclusions reached 
during the investigation of the case. 
A. Therapist-Patient Relationship 
The Roscoe court expressed discomfort with the use of a ther-
apist's diagnosis of a patient as substantive evidence offered to 
prove the allegations against the defendant. The court feared 
the misuse of psychological testimony through the introduction 
of conclusions reached by the therapist during a process not 
designed to determine the truth or accuracy of the particular 
past event. The court also feared the introduction of the pa-
tient's account of events derived during that process and used to 
support the therapist's conclusions. 213 Thus, according to Ros-
coe, evidence obtained in a noncritical therapeutic setting214 may 
not be introduced as proof that the events took place. . 
In deciding whether particular evidence fits within the rubric 
established in Roscoe, one must look at the nature of the evi-
dence and the context in which it was derived. Analogies to rape 
trauma syndrome2111 and battered child syndrome216 evidence are 
instructive. Rape trauma syndrome evidence is a description of 
an individual's reactions to trauma.217 As a general proposition, 
the conclusion that an individual is experiencing rape trauma 
213. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50. 
214. The encounter in Roscoe can be characterized as "noncritical" therapy because 
the purpose was not to challenge the child's account, but to provide support and assis-
tance to him. In People v. Payan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct. App. 1985), the court noted the 
distinction, apparently assuming a "critical" therapeutic interview with an intervenor 
would yield information that would be more reliable in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 133. 
Whether the usual interview between intervenor and child falls into the former or latter 
class is a question that should be analyzed not just by examining the formal relationship 
of the parties (e.g., therapist-patient), but by asking whether in fact the encounter is a 
"noncritical" one. The role of the intervenor as advocate may preclude the existence of a 
"critical" therapeutic relationship. 
215. See Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1097, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (citing People v. 
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984)); see also supra note 57. 
216. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249, 681 P.2d at 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458; 
Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 
J. A,M.A. 17 (1962) (advising physicians to look for poor health, poor hygiene, or soft 
tissue injury, and for discrepancies in what the parents say happened and the extent of 
the injury); see also supra note 1. 
217. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 246, 681 P.2d at 297, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57; see supra 
note 57. 
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syndrome is made by a counselor engaged in provicling support 
and therapy to a rape victim. The primary purpose of the coun-
selor-client relationship is to provide services to the client, not 
to derive proof that a crime occurred. 218 In contrast, evidence of 
battered child syndrome ordinarily is obtained through a physi-
cal examination that searches for bone injury, subdural hemato-
mas, and other serious injuries. 219 The principal purpose of the 
inquiry is not to provide emotional support for the child, but to 
determine whether the child's injuries are intentional or acci-
dental so further intervention can be planned if necessary. Be-
cause of the different context in which the information is ac-
quired, the evidence is treated differently; usually, the court 
does not admit the rape counselor's conclusion that a rape oc-
curred, but does admit the medical examiner's conclusion that 
the child was battered. 
Applying the two-part inquiry220 into the nature of the evi-
dence and how it was derived can be useful in determining what 
portion of the expert testimony should be admitted in a child 
sexual abuse case. In Roscoe, for example, the court concluded 
that expert testimony about molestation, at least as rebuttal evi-
dence, that was based on professional literature and experi-
ence221 satisfied the first prong of the two-part test. The second 
prong of the test was not met, however: derivation of the evi-
dence in the therapist-patient setting blocked admissibility be-
cause of the nonchallenging, noncritical character of the en-
counters and their primary purpose as therapeutic sessions for 
the child. 222 
Moreover, not only does this two-part assessment resolve the 
issue of admissibility where a formal, therapist-patient relation-
ship exists, but by requiring an analysis of the context in which 
the expert reached the conclusion and an examination of the ex-
pert's relationship with the child, it also has implications for 
cases where a formal, therapist-patient relationship does not 
exist.223 
Roscoe's two-part test is flawed, however, and People v. 
Payan224 demonstrates the extent of the problem. If the nature 
of the evidence meets the first prong-that the evidence about 
218. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 250-51, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60. 
219. Id. at 249, 681 P.2d at 299-300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459; see supra note 214. 
220. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
221. People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985). 
222. Id., at 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50. 
223. See infra text accompanying notes 224-29. 
224. 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct. App. 1985). 
' 
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child sexual abuse is in itself reliable and useful to the fact 
finder-then, by implication, if the expert has not reached his or 
her conclusions in a therapeutic setting, the conclusion that the 
child was molested would be admissible. 2211 Allowing the expert 
to offer such conclusions when he or she has not even inter-
viewed the child, however, does not comport with accepted prac-
tice among experts dealing with child sexual abuse.226 In addi-
tion, admitting such a conclusion appears to be an unwarranted 
deviation from the rule prohibiting expert testimony on the 
credibility of a witness. For both reasons, the type of evidence 
offered in Payan, which would be admissible under the Roscoe 
two-prong test, should be excluded. 
B. The Advocacy Role or Performance of Multiple Functions 
Although the role is not part of a statutory or other officially 
defined description of duties, the intervenor in a child sexual 
abuse case might become the advocate for the child, either in-
tentionally or unintentionally.227 In an effort to improve upon 
investigative techniques used with children, experts in the field 
of ·child sexual abuse have recommended an interviewing process 
that will have a "therapeutic" effect on the child. 228 While this 
recommendation does not mean that the intervenor will literally 
engage in therapy with the child, it does convey the overall na-
ture of the relationship as a helping, supportive one. Even 
though the primary task of the intervenor might be to investi-
gate and determine the facts, 229 this recommendation considers 
the creation of a supportive atmosphere for the child equally im-
portant. As a matter of policy, the "therapeutic" approach might 
be the preferred route; but once we create that relationship, we 
must examine how the intervenor should function for the re-
mainder of the case. The key inquiry should be whether the 
"helping" aspect of the relationship has overshadowed the inves-
tigative function to the extent that the intervenor has assumed a 
role equivalent to that of a "noncritical" therapist. 
The question becomes particularly compelling where the in-
tervenor performs several functions. If, as a general proposition, 
the intervenor is to investigate the facts, but the advocacy role 
225. Id. 
226. See supra note 63. 
227. See supra notes 178-93 and accompanying text. 
228. See Sgroi, Porter & Blick, supra note 63, at 48. 
229. Id. at 39-40. 
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has become of paramount importance to him or her, the integ-
rity of the investigative process may be questionable. This is 
particularly important when the government seeks to introduce 
the testimony of the intervenor as an investigator and expert 
witness who will conclude that the child was molested. 
At least two methods are available to address this situation. 
The first is to analogize to Roscoe and allow the intervenor· to 
testify about child sexual abuse in general, but not to permit an 
opinion that the complainant was molested or to relate in detail 
the underlying facts supporting such an opinion. 230 The ratio-
nale for this standard is that the proffered evidence was derived 
in a setting in which the intervenor assumed a role equivalent to 
a therapist, so it should be treated in a like manner. 
The second option should be exercised in those situations 
where the intervenor has assumed multiple, overlapping, or 
poorly-defined roles that call into question the integrity of the 
fact-finding aspect of the investigation itself.231 In such situa-
tions, a more radical alternative is appropriate because of the 
weight accorded the intervenor's assessment. 232 Such an alterna-
tive is the use of a court-appointed expert. 
The case law and the Federal Rules of Evidence both recog-
nize the power of a trial judge to appoint an expert of his or her 
selection.233 The most frequently cited reason for giving the 
judge this power is to eliminate the battle of experts, in the hope 
that a neutral appointee will enhance the fact finder's ability to 
determine the truth in the case. 234 
This option has considerable potential for child sexual abuse 
cases but for different reasons than anticipated by the drafters 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 706. If we recognize that some of 
the benefits of the adversary system have been sacrificed in the 
230. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099-1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1985); see supra 
notes 55-60, 209-19 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra note 123. 
232. E.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45; State v. Logue, 
372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D. 1985). The expert evidence is introduced to assist the jury in 
resolving the disputed issues of fact in the case. Presumably, the jury will give a fair 
amount of weight to the expert's testimony even if an instruction is given advising the 
jury that it may accept or reject the expert opinion in reaching its conclusions. 
233. FED. R. Evm. 706; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 17. Procedurally, 
the appointment may be by the court's own motion or at the request of either party. An 
expert appointed by the court must be informed of his or her duties in writing or at a 
conference in which both parties may participate. At trial, the expert may be called by 
the court or by either party. 
234. FED. R. Evm. 706 advisory committee's note; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra 
note 29, ll 706(01]. 
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effort to mitigate harshness in child sexual abuse cases,m a 
means of recapturing some of those benefits is appealing. The 
most noteworthy benefit of the adversary system that is lost is 
the injection of a second point of view into a case. This benefit 
was lost when the system delegated multiple functions to a sin-
gle individual or relied on the child's advocate for expert testi-
mony. The court-appointed expert should conduct a critical 
evaluation of the investigation and of the conclusions reached 
whenever an expert's roles overlap. In particular, the evaluation 
should determine whether an important and relevant viewpoint 
was omitted, whether the procedures served the truth-seeking 
function, and whether the performance of multiple functions has 
undermined the conclusions in the case. 236 Additional inquiries 
based on the specific fact pattern could be requested.237 If the 
court appointee determines that there are important flaws in the 
235. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
236. See, e.g., State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1984). In that case, the 
state supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the 
child's statements to two intervenors demonstrated circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness sufficient to qualify for admissibility under the residual exception to the hear-
say rule, FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5). The defendant called as an expert witness a psychiatrist 
who critiqued the circumstances under which one of the intervenors obtained the state-
ments from the child. The psychiatrist pointed out that if an intervenor has had a prior 
therapeutic relationship with the child, as had one intervenor, then this relationship 
should have caused the intervenor to disqualify herself. His reasons were that serving as 
an intervenor might disrupt any future therapeutic relationship with the child, and, 
more importantly, that the relationship might create a bias in conducting an objective 
evaluation. Record of Remand, supra note 205, at 102. The psychiatrist pointed out that 
the client, fearful of rejection and losing a relationship with the intervenor, might tell the 
intervenor things to please him or her. He concluded that the problems caused by the 
manner of conducting the evaluation raised a serious question about its validity, and, in 
fact, that the results of the interview were invalid and unreliable. Id. at 105-07. 
The trial judge responded to the psychiatrist's testimony by citing the South Dakota 
Supreme Court opinion that remanded the case, State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W. 2d 159, 
164 (S.D: 1984), in which the court commented that a child is unlikely to fabricate a 
graphic act of sexual activity because it is beyond the realm of his or her experience. The 
psychiatrist stated his general agreement with that view, but pointed out that the in-
quiry should be whether the particular child has had such an experience, not whether 
children in general do. Record of Remand, supra note 205, at 107-09. 
Interestingly, the defense also produced evidence from a friend of the child's mother 
that the child had observed him engaging in sexual intercourse with the mother. Record 
of Remand, supra note 205, at 95. Neither the original intervenor nor the trial judge 
seemed to have found that information determinative. 
The trial court found that the child's statements demonstrated circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness and, based on that determination, affirmed the defendant's con-
viction. McCatferty, 356 N.W.2d at 167. 
237. In McCafferty, the intervenor had a prior therapeutic relationship with the 
child. 356 N.W.2d at 161. An inquiry to determine the effect that might have on the 
investigation and validation process would be appropriate. 
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case based on these criteria, the court should grant the defense 
motion to restrict the role of the intervenor in the case. 238 
Why is the inclusion of another layer of expertise warranted in 
child sexual abuse cases? Modifications to the adversary system 
in such cases have been made to eliminate the trial of the child-
victim. Revamped hearsay rules, a more humane investigative 
process, and the assistance of experts and advocates have ac-
complished this goal in many respects. The defense of child sex-
ual abuse cases formerly focused on the victim and his or her 
capacity to endure cross-examination at trial-if the case even 
progressed that far. The system now in many respects has sub-
stituted adults, such as parents and child sexual abuse_ profes-
sionals, for the child. The defendant's focus also must shift; now 
he or she must be prepared to respond to the child's claims as 
expressed not only by the child, but also by the adults in the 
case. Because any experts that the defendant wishes to engage 
will not have access to the child, 239 and because the validation 
process normally takes place long before trial without the de-
fendant's participation,2 • 0 there is virtually no opportunity to 
challenge either the investigative process or the conclusions ex-
cept at trial. By the time of trial, however, the child sexual 
abuse professional will be expected to serve as a government 
witness in the adversary process, and the defendant will have , 
little or no basis on which to challenge the witness's conclusions. 
Inserting a check through the use of a court-appointed expert 
ensures the integrity of the process to a greater extent than 
presently exists. 2• 1 This additional factor, coupled with more hu-
mane treatment of the child, creates a more equitable balancing 
of the interests of the disputants and of society. 
In essence, this is a formal, court-sponsored implementation 
of the team review process2• 2 that has been recommended for 
238. See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra note 207. 
241. In those jurisdictions where court appointees are used to review cases, an added 
benefit would be the avoidance of conflicting and poorly-defined roles by intervenors at 
the outset. Preempting undesired conduct by experts is touted as one favorable side-
effect of the rule permitting court appointments. See FEo. R. Evm. 706 advisory commit-
tee's note. 
242. Implementation of a team approach to case management has been suggested in 
similar contexts. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 151, at 514-20. These authors argue 
that a structured decisionmaking process is essential so that forensic clinicians may re-
duce error and promote consistency in their evaluations of defendants in the criminal 
justice system. Use of a team of professionals. from various· disciplines, who are in-
structed to consider as many hypotheses as possible in resolving the questions presented 
by the case, is one method of achieving the goal. Bonnie and Slobogin acknowledge this 
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child sexual abuse cases by experts in the field. 243 The experts 
recognize their own shortcomings in handling such cases and ap-
preciate the potential of multidisciplinary team review to im-
prove the quality of case management and to provide expertise 
that otherwise might be absent. This preferred method of case 
analysis is one that should be incorporated into the legal system. 
What showing should be required to obtain a court-appointed 
expert? The defense counsel should examine how the intervenor 
has functioned in the case to see if he or she has performed con-
flicting roles. Of particular concern are activities244 or influences 
that might have interfered with the investigative role of the in-
tervenor, because the "validation" process .relies so heavily on 
the intervenor's subjective evaluation of the situation.2411 Exam-
ples of problematic influences are preconceived notions about 
child sexual abuse and its dynamics,246 which impede the inter-
venor's investigation to see whether the case at hand actually 
fits the patterns that the intervenor expects to find. When facts 
exist to rebut the generalizations about sexual abuse247 but the 
intervenor has dismissed them as nondeterminative, further in-
quiry is appropriate. In the alternative, if the child's account is 
confused and corroborating evidence is not apparent, an inde-
pendent probing of the intervenor's investigation is warranted to 
test the validity of the conclusion that abuse exists. 
A related inquiry should be made to determine what the inter-
venor has done to assist the child personally and to evaluate 
what type of relationship the intervenor has developed with the 
child. If the intervenor has assumed an advocacy or therapy 
function, then outside scrutiny is warranted to see if the results 
of the intervenor's work are reliable enough for use in the crimi-
nal process. 248 
is one way to minimize the· influence of "personal predilections and ideologies upon the 
decisionmaking process." Id. at 514. 
243. See supra note 209. A less radical alternative to the use of a court-appointed 
expert to provide the team review function is to grant defense motions to discover re-
ports prepared by a child sexual abuse team already in place in the jurisdiction, if one 
exists. 
244. See supra note 179. 
245. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text. 
246. For example, children do not lie about sexual abuse or children do not have 
sexual knowledge. See supra notes 86-87. 
247. E.g., Record of Remand, supra note 205, at 95 (child had observed acts of sexual 
intercourse between her mother and a man other than the defendant prior to making a 
statement about the defendant's conduct). 
248. A conclusion that the results of the investigation are unreliable for a criminal 
prosecution does not necessarily preclude their use in an administrative proceeding 
where the government's burden of proof would be lower. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
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CONCLUSION 
541 
Recent modifications to the adversary system to accommodate 
child victims reflect a recognition of their needs and the impor-
tance of vindicating their rights. The participation of experts on 
behalf of children has enhanced the ability of the legal system to 
respond to the needs and rights of the child victim. That exper-
tise should be critically evaluated to ensure it is being employed 
in child sexual abuse cases in an appropriate manner. In those 
situations where the expertise might be misused because of the 
performance of a · therapeutic or advocative role by the inter-
venor, the court should limit the testimony to exclude an assess-
ment of the validity of the prosecuting witness's claim. Where 
the integrity of the investigation is called into question, the 
court should exercise the option of using a court-appointed ex-
pert. Adding these checks should serve to maintain the influence 
of intervenors in child sexual abuse cases without jeopardizing 
the benefits of an adversary adjudication of guilt or innocence. 
§ 26-8-22.5 (1984) (requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding 
that a child is dependent or neglected). 

